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REAR SERVICES IN WAR AGAINST U.S. REVIEWED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 82 pp 55-59

[Article by Senior Colonel Nguyen Viet Phuong: "Several Experiences in the War of Resistance Against the United States for National Salvation Regarding Guiding and Commanding Strategic Rear Service Support on Line 559 in the 1973-1975 Stage of the War"]

[Text] Generally speaking, when wars enter their decisive stage, the general offensives that bring wars to victorious conclusions occur over a "relatively broad scope" but occur repeatedly in "a short space of time" on the basis of material and mobility factors that meet the requirements of "large quantity, rapid speed and predeployment." Only in this way is it possible to rapidly and completely crush the will and ability of the enemy to resist and reduce our losses to the lowest possible level. This is the very complex, general problem of strategic rear service support work in preparation for major opportunities, especially in preparations for an historic opportunity to win total victory.

In the war against the United States to liberate the South, very important leaps forward occurred in the final stage, a stage concerning which the Political Bureau observed "one day was the equivalent of 20 years." This reality determined the urgent nature of strategic preparations in every field of rear service work, from the national rear area to the frontlines.

Area 559 was the forward strategic rear service line of the army.(1) Its main political task was to provide the highest possible level of transport support for each material base, technical base and the manpower being sent to the South and the friendly countries in order to wage the revolutionary war against the U.S. imperialist aggressors and their lackeys. Due to the special characteristics of the complex form of the war of resistance against the United States on the battlefield in the South and the battlefields in the friendly countries in Southeast Asia and due to the fact that all other communications lines were blockaded by the enemy, line 559 became the most basic, primary rear service support line, became the line of extremely important strategic significance in the immediate future as well as over the long range. From 1970 until the conclusion of the war

of resistance, every material and technical need supporting military operations, the welfare of the people, the economy, the military corps and branches going to the front, delegations of cadres of our government and party and those of our friends going to the battlefield and so forth had to be met on the basis of the system of roads and bridges, the command organization and the various aspects of rear service support along the line. Because of the strategic position occupied by the Truong Son area, as soon as it was established, line 559 was gradually organized by the Military Commission of the Central Party Committee into the staging area for main force military corps, into jumping off points for attacks and into the receiving line for the various fronts; in the final stage of the war of liberation, it reached a scale unprecedented in the history of war in our country.

As the point of convergence of each source of materiel, technology and manpower being sent from the socialist rear area to the front and of all exchanges adjacent to the battlefield, area 559 attracted the heaviest attacks by the enemy, attracted extremely heavy, wicked attacks by the enemy and was constantly the scene of interdiction campaigns and fierce anti-interdiction campaigns that lasted throughout the course of the war.

In order to fulfill its task, line 559 had to have a thorough understanding of the political line and task and the military line and task of the party and prepare itself in advance for the activities of the armed forces.

Throughout the course of its activities, line 559 learned one fundamental lesson: to always find time to make preparations and broaden the scope of its operations. This was an experience in victory that was gained over many years and applied very thoroughly in the general offensive and uprising in the spring of 1975. Prior campaigns and battles raised the requirement of preparing one year for the next year, preparing for the next task by means of the present task and providing increasingly large material support. Following the victory of the Paris Agreement, these preparations became increasingly urgent and raised the requirement of providing unprecedented material support. They demanded very high determination. This determination could not merely be expressed in words, rather, it had to be expressed by means of real actions, by means of transport efficiency. It was necessary to correctly evaluate the enemy and ourselves on the scope of our area of operation. On the basis of deciding and daring to accept a task many times larger, we boldly proposed major improvements to our organization, determinedly expanded our scope of operations, boldly changed our mode of operation and revolutionized our style of command and work by performing large jobs, performing one job after another and competing with the enemy, with time.

These requirements, which were never simple to meet, now, in the face of a major opportunity, were raising many difficult, complex and new problems for cadres and soldiers. If the thinking of cadres and soldiers was not thoroughly remolded, they would become complacent and lose their vigilance or become skeptical, hesitate, become conservative and stop. As a result of properly resolving the problem of

the thinking regarding victory and opportunity, line 559 uprooted everything that was outmoded, brought its immense apparatus into a new orb of operation, expanded the Truong Son area of operation both vertically and horizontally and transported in a short amount of time a large volume of supplies that formerly would have taken several years to transport.

However, once progressive thinking had been molded and the large task was at hand, it was necessary to establish a progressive organization in order to achieve corresponding efficiency. That is, because there is an organization for every task, it was necessary to swiftly improve the organization and reorganize forces without being conservative in order to win victory. If we thought and acted in a contrary manner, it would have been difficult to complete our task and might even have resulted in defeat. Because, the organization, although it originates in the task, becomes the foundation of every activity and insures the development of the strength of each force for the purpose of completing the task.

From the time that they shifted to the mechanized mode of transportation, the forces of line 559 underwent four major organizational improvements.(2) After each time its organization was improved and made more efficient, the ability of line 559 to rapidly receive the large quantity of supplies being sent from the rear area increased and it achieved better results with each passing year.(3)

In the stage of the major change in the revolutionary war and in the face of an extremely large, historic opportunity, inefficiency emerged within the area headquarters organization and the strategic military transport line. With the approval of the Military Commission of the Central Party Committee, headquarters 559 rapidly organized divisions. However, the fundamental problem involved in this change of organization was changing the various forms of tactics and creatively applying the tactics of each branch under the new organizational conditions that existed. The main problem involved changing transport tactics, efficiently reorganizing the "basic routes" and changing the form of organization of the coordinated branches in each battle.

Of course, every change in the form of an organization generally gives rise to many difficulties and problems and is impeded by conservatism and a lack of enthusiasm. However, on the basis of the pressing needs to "liberate" fighting strength from the "constraints" of the old organizational relationships and creating a new strength, achieving a higher productivity became the test of the efficiency of the organization, became the purpose of building the organization in combat. It was absolutely necessary to overcome obstacles in order to create a number of new organizations suited to the requirements of the new task.

As a result of changing the organization of the strategic military transport line to the division form, engineer forces could begin to work on a large scale, work in a centralized and highly specialized manner in well coordinated production lines and coordinate their four strengths: manpower, horsepower, energy and improved tools. As a result, in the space of only 18 months, the engineer forces

had opened new roads, carried out capital construction and improved old roads in accordance with established standards over a distance of more than 1,600 kilometers.

The truck divisions now operated on new routes that were five times longer than before; depending upon the enemy situation and the weather, they could abandon transportation "by routes" and quickly implement the "direct transportation" of each division to the various battlefields, achieving a productivity of 2,250 percent compared to 1965-1966 and 202 percent compared to 1971-1972.

The infantry divisions and anti-aircraft divisions flexibly employed blocking tactics to control the enemy and staged mobile attacks in coordination with the large-scale, annihilating attacks on the main fronts and in the main areas. They coordinated with our friends on the Lao battlefield, attacked and annihilated the enemy, liberated scores of cities and towns, pushed the enemy far down the Mekong River and expanded and strengthened the liberated zone of that friendly country and our country along the Truong Son line.

When the strategic general offensive started, as a result of being prepared and as a result of having time to practice, the divisions of line 559 showed themselves to be rather proficient in coordinating in combat with the combat divisions and military corps. And, as a result of having achieved good quality, ample forces and high mobility, these divisions rapidly carried out the order of the high command to transport anti-aircraft divisions, infantry divisions, truck divisions, technical regiments and so forth to support or coordinate in combat on the battlefield while transporting military corps to combat positions.

It can be said that our army never moved fully equipped, modern military corps as rapidly and systematically as it did in the general offensive in the spring of 1975; this occurred so rapidly that up until the day that we opened fire, American and puppet intelligence agencies still predicted that it would be 1 more month before we arrived. This was a very new event, was a very great achievement in the art of guiding strategic rear service support work in the war of resistance against the United States for national salvation. This success was due to many reasons, but one of the reasons of decisive significance was that we had proposed and completely implemented the policy of determinedly focusing our efforts on improving the roads and bridges along the strategic transport line in coordination with developing the network of campaign roads. This was a very basic factor that firmly guaranteed mobility on the part of the army.

Clearly, this problem could not have been resolved in a very short period of time. It had to be actively resolved throughout the stage of preparations and had to have the wholehearted support of the state and the army. In this effort, the party committee of headquarters 559 especially concerned itself with researching and building new bridges and roads consistent with the new strategic guidelines, with the investment of the largest number of forces (4) and the greatest amount of

equipment possible. We also focused our intelligence in developing progressive work methods, determined to complete the improvement of the western road system, open eastern roads and build basic roads in accordance with established standards(5) in a short period of time, thereby creating two parallel, reliable road systems leading to the rear areas of the various battlefields and fronts. By late 1974, the strategic road system had been extended all the way to Loc Ninh, thereby establishing an interconnected network of roads that supported one another and guaranteed the transportation of many times more strategic reinforcements; the mechanized military corps were able to operate continuously at a density of 10 to 15 vehicles per kilometer (the average) throughout the year (with the exception of the months when heavy flooding occurred). As the road network increasingly spread toward the east and approached the enemy, we transported troops by mechanized means on the various fronts, deeply penetrated the enemy's territory and developed upon our victories with increasing ease and efficiency.

In the expanded Truong Son strategic base, the system of roads and bridges developed many horizontal and vertical axes. In particular, after the liberation of Quang Tri, the reopened port of Dong Ha became a relatively large receiving center for reinforcements from the national rear area. The truck convoys of the state and army also conducted transport operations along Route 9. The strategic military transport line promptly organized large storehouse areas to insure the movement of one or two truck regiments per day.

On the frontlines, the linking of the mechanized road network of the strategic line with the strategic road system created new conditions for transport units to reach the rear area of the front. This was a new and very large advantage for the various battlefields; at the same time, it guaranteed that the transport cycle of trucks would be maintained and reduced the amount of time and manpower needed for cargo handling at trans-shipment stations.

On this basis, a new battle position was deployed for strategic transport work:

--Two basic routes involving 4 to 6 days per trip or 8 days per trip depending upon the nature of the fighting in the two zones, were organized. We constructed and intermediate shipment storehouse area and groups of strategic stockpile storehouses at positions where the most traffic occurred and close to remote battlefields.

--A gasoline-oil support system and technical support system were established on the main transportation axes.

--We organized temporary stop-over routes for truck troops and supply stations along the line.

--On the basis of the strategic information network and the information network of communications support troops, we organized transport command operations by route, etc.

Through these numerous organizational improvements, we increased our ability to concentrate on the main task, eliminated many trans-shipment operations, increased the speed at which trucks operated and reduced the amount of time involved in the transportation cycle, consequently, the transport efficiency of the truck divisions increased by 120 to 150 percent.

Also during this period of time, we attached special importance to investing as much as possible in the development of the pipeline in the Truong Song region. Gaining experience from 1972, we constructed a fuel supply system and a major stockpile system in the Central Highlands adjacent to the Nam Bo battlefield. This was an extremely important victory. It was the key element in the rate of development of the strategic military transport line, was the key to the rapid mobility of the various services and branches in the general offensive on the various fronts of the recent battlefield in the South.

FOOTNOTES

1. The transport department line of the Rear Services General Department was the strategic rear service line in the rear.
2. In 1965 and 1966 we organized the line, below which were two to four troop stations (Vietnamese: binh tran). Between 1966 and 1968, we organized troop stations that commanded combined branches in combat. In 1969 and 1970, on the basis of the troop stations, troop stations for each front were established in each main area. In the South, the line organized headquarters 470. Between 1971 and 1973, we organized area headquarters 471, 472, 473 and 571.
3. Taking 1965-1966 as 100, 1966-1967 equalled 210 percent; 1968-1969 equalled 520 percent; 1970-1971 equalled 610 percent; and 1972-1973 equalled 830 percent.
4. At the start of 1973, the engineer forces were combined into divisions; 70 to 80 percent of their forces were used in capital construction.
5. Roadways were wide enough for two trucks to pass each other; road beds were raised, made firm and spread with stone or graded.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

IMPROVEMENTS TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES SUGGESTED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 82 pp 30-36

[Article by Senior Colonel Bach Ngoc Lien: "The Special Operations Forces and the Art of Attack"]

[Text] Attacks are a unique product, are a strongpoint of our nation's way of fighting the enemy, one that has been formed and developed over the course of several thousand years of struggling to defend and build the country. In the two victorious war of resistance against the powerful imperialists, France and the United States, our army and people, adhering firmly to the military thinking and line of the Vietnam Communist Party and inheriting and developing upon our forefathers' creative art of fighting the enemy, brought about substantive changes in the art of attack. The continuous development of this art has been consistent with the level of development of weapons and technical equipment and the gradual improvement of the military organization and army organization of our state in the various periods of the revolution. Attacking is considered the basic, primary and universal form of warfare of our people's armed forces.

During the very first days of the fight against the French colonialist aggressors, our Special Operations Forces, in the form of commando units and suicide units, swiftly adopted the offensive thinking of the people's war in our country. These small, efficient but well trained fighting organizations achieved very high efficiency in combat. They helped to cause the emergence of the premises of the creative, unique art of attack of the Special Operations Forces in the Vietnamese people's war.

In the war of resistance against the United States for national salvation, the date 19 March 1967 was made the date of the official establishment of the Special Operations Forces. At that time, the army and people of South Vietnam had defeated the "special war" strategy of the Americans and the puppets, had begun to defeat their "limited war" strategy and were launching stronger and more widespread attacks than in any previous period. The Special Operations Forces emerged at that time as a combat branch of the Vietnam People's Army that was closely linked to the growing offensive of the people's war in our country.

Together with the other services and branches, the Special Operations Forces attacked the enemy on land, in the air and at sea, attacked the enemy at small bases and large bases, annihilated enemy forces within strong fortifications as well as when they were outside their fortifications, attacked communication lines, rear service bases and nerve centers and so forth, killing many enemy troops and destroying many of the enemy's modern means of war. Many of the battles fought by the Special Operations Forces in our people's war of resistance against the United States for national salvation are famous battles. The attack on the Bien Hoa Airfield destroyed nearly 60 U.S. aircraft and the attack on the Lien Chieu fuel depot destroyed hundreds of millions of liters of enemy gasoline. The attack on the U.S. base in Saigon killed hundreds of enemy, including many generals, colonels and pilots. There was the attack on the Ben Luc Bridge, which was more than 500 meters long, that collapsed the bridge in June, 1968; the sinking of an enemy warship with a transport capacity of tens of thousands of tons, which destroyed a joint force American-puppet floating base; the attacks on and occupation of important targets in coordination with the forces participating in the 1975 spring general offensive and so forth. These were feats of arms that reflected the bravery and intelligence, the initiative in taking attacks, the unique art of attack and the high combat efficiency of the Special Operations Forces. By means of their activities and achievements, the Special Operations Forces made a worthy contribution to the total victory of the fight against the United States and accepted, effectively implemented and helped to develop the art of attack of the Vietnam revolutionary war.

It can be said that the period of the resistance against the United States for national salvation was one of the most brilliant periods of the growth and development of the Special Operations Forces politically, spiritually and organizationally as well as in terms of their forces, equipment, military skills and art of attack. With regard to the art of attack, this was a period in which the Special Operations Forces established and developed, in a relatively basic and comprehensive manner, their method of fighting, which is a unique method that uses few troops to win victory over many, uses high quality to win victory over large forces. Thoroughly understanding the offensive strategic thinking of the revolutionary war and on the basis of the mastery achieved by the people and the armed forces on the various battlefields, the Special Operations Forces conducted bold, precise and lightning-like surprise attacks on many types of very important targets of the enemy in the course of the war, thereby inflicting heavy losses upon the forces and means of war of the enemy and striking fear in and panic in their hearts. These were not only attacks designed to impede the immediate combat activities and acts of aggression of the enemy, but they also had the purpose of attacking targets and causing long-range damage to the enemy. They not only involved selective attacks upon the enemy outside their perimeter, but also attacks on targets deep within the strongholds of the enemy, thereby inflicting very painful and effective blows upon them. The targets of attacks were not only puppet troops, but American troops as well. Many attacks on airfields, warehouses, bases, command centers, communications centers and barracks of the U.S. aggressors, attacks which killed valuable forces of the enemy, destroyed many of their modern means of war and were very highly efficient, caused even their electronic detection and alarm equipment to be ineffective and caused the

enemy to be panic stricken. The targets of attacks were not only in the mountainous jungles and the countryside, but also in the lowlands and the cities, on land, in the air and at sea. The scale of attacks varied; they were independent attacks and attacks launched under many different forms of coordination with other branches and forces.

The attacks of the Special Operations Forces are an art and a science. The methods of organizing and carrying out actual attacks are the results of detailed, painstaking and specific research based on firm foundations in many areas. The determination of targets, timing, positions and the use of forces and weapons, the determination of combat formations, methods of penetration, advance routes, withdrawal routes, methods of camouflage and so forth are the results of objective and extremely detailed analysis of the factors that form the strength of a battle. Bravery is a decisive factor but cannot take the place of everything else. Every action of cadres and soldiers in battle must be planned and organized in a truly precise manner, in close coordination with the actions of the other members of their unit in order to attack the enemy at a time when they are weak, attack their weaknesses, take maximum advantage of the terrain, the weather, sunlight, time and so forth. As a result, the Special Operations Forces achieved a high degree of precision and high efficiency in many attacks.

Therefore, it can be said that the art of attack infused the Special Operations Forces with boundless strength. And, the Special Operations soldier has become one of the beautiful expressions of Vietnamese revolutionary heroism. The art of attack of the Special Operations Forces is impregnated with the spirit of the nation, the revolutionary spirit, the science and the modern nature of the military art of the Vietnamese people's war. This art helped the Special Operations Forces annihilate many forces and means of war of the enemy, preserve their own forces and simultaneously fight well and build up their forces well under extremely complicated, violent circumstances and conditions. It helped the Special Operations Forces not only complete or excellently complete their tasks in battles and campaigns, but also in the strategic activities of our army and people in the resistance against the United States for national salvation. As a result, the Special Operations Forces were also closely associated with attacks. Launching attacks became an attribute of the combat activities of the Special Operations Forces.

As a method of armed struggle employed by a well trained special combat branch under new conditions, the art of attack of the Special Operations Forces must undergo new developments in the war to defend the socialist Vietnamese fatherland.

Our nation's war to defend the socialist fatherland must contend with and win victory over a new strategic warfare objective, the Chinese aggressor army. This is a war waged under the circumstances of our people having become the masters of their entire fatherland and are building socialism throughout the country. This war will be waged by means of the tremendous, unprecedented combined strength of our army and people, of a social system moving forward against the background of new developments regarding the military line, military strategy and methods of

waging war as well as the mode of armed struggle and the method of warfare with a view toward defeating aggressive attacks by the Beijing expansionists and hegemonists against us in the air, on the land and at sea. This strength is prepared and built before war breaks out and is continuously developed in the process of a war. New developments have been and are occurring within our army concerning its level of equipment and weapons, the organization and structure of the branches and services and warfare capabilities. The fight between ourselves and the enemy will be arduous, violent and large scale from the very first days of the war. Our defensive position is becoming stronger with each passing day; it is the battle position of being the masters of each locality, of each battlefield and the entire country in order to take the initiative in bringing the greatest possible strength to bear in the fight against the enemy when they launch a war of aggression against our country. The factors mentioned above have a strong impact upon the art of attack of the Special Operations Forces.

The realities of the fight against the Chinese aggressor army and its encroachment along the northern border of our country have shown that the Special Operations Forces retain their original role entirely in joining the other branches and forces in attacking the enemy on the frontline of the fatherland and shown that their art of attack embodies many new factors.

In the war to defend the fatherland, the Special Operations Forces will probably have to attack enemy troops coming from the outside, not enemy troops permanently stationed in our country as was the case in the war of liberation. Consequently, maintaining close contact with the enemy, reconnoitering the enemy, selecting targets, selecting the time to fight, the methods for preparing and carrying out attacks and so forth must be based on new, appropriate modes. It is necessary to victoriously carry out battles which last for a long time but for which there is little time to prepare and battles in areas in which many advantages exist as well as battles in areas in which there are many difficulties and the situation is undergoing complex changes. Regardless of conditions, the attacks waged by the Special Operations Forces must be attacks for which preparations are made, which are tightly organized, in which the targets that must be destroyed are known, in which secrecy and surprise are maintained and which are carried out rapidly, systematically and with high combat efficiency. Therefore, we must employ our strength as masters who are prepared, who have a battle position, who have troops and have the people on their side; we must take thorough advantage of the weakness of the enemy as an aggressor coming from far away to whom the terrain is strange and who is being violently attacked and can be easily divided, isolated and so forth.

In fighting enemy forces coming from the outside, the attacks waged by the Special Operations Forces will probably take place first on the frontline, in the border mountainous jungles, the seacoast and the islands. In these areas, the Special Operations Forces have the capabilities, more than a few capabilities, to deliver painful, serious blows to the enemy. However, turning these capabilities into reality demands that the Special Operations Forces make innovations regarding

their tactics and techniques. They must know how to attack enemy forces in front of themselves, behind themselves and on their flanks, attack the enemy on the mainland, in the mountainous jungles, the lowlands and the cities, even on rivers, at sea and on the islands. They must know how to attack the enemy on the frontline, behind the frontline and even in their rear area. Combat, command operations and signal operations must be organized very skillfully, combat coordination must be very precise and close, secrecy and surprise must be achieved and maximum use must be made of the advantages afforded by the prepared battle position and the terrain in order to achieve a favorable position and use well trained forces to win victory over large enemy forces.

The attack efficiency of the Special Operations Forces in a war to defend the fatherland depends very much upon their ability to fight independently and fight in coordination with other forces. Both of these methods of fighting are utilized within the common formation, the common battle position in the combat, campaigns and strategic activities of the people's war in each area, in each direction and on each battlefield, with the Special Operations Forces conducting their operations under unified guidance. Therefore, when we talk about fighting independently we are only talking in relative terms. However, it must be realized that fighting independently is the basic and universal mode of operation, is the strongpoint of the Special Operations Forces and is a method of fighting that generally results in high combat efficiency. Therefore, the Special Operations Forces must be skilled in fighting independently and must employ this method of fighting in a manner consistent with new conditions. However, the Special Operations Forces need not only fight independently; they can and must coordinate in combat with other forces well, with the infantry, artillery forces, tank forces and eventually with the air force, airborne troops and naval forces in a manner consistent with the requirements of modern warfare. The thinking that the Special Operations Forces are only suited to guerrilla warfare and are not suited to combat coordinated among the various branches and services of a modern war is incorrect in the present stage of development of Vietnamese military realities. In coordinated combat operations, the Special Operations Forces must always look for every way to utilize their ability to move far ahead, to deal painful, serious blows to the enemy, to attack targets that other branches find it difficult to attack or hit. There must be a good division of labor and responsibilities among the various branches and, on this basis, the conditions must be created for all branches to fulfill their role in order to avoid the problem of not fully utilizing the strength of each branch and the problem of one branch performing the function or task of another.

Whether fighting independently or coordinating in combat, the Special Operations Forces must fight under the present circumstances in which our army has been strengthened and improved with regard to its weapons and technical equipment. war to defend the fatherland raises new requirements regarding the use of increasingly modern weapons and technical equipment. Therefore, the art of attack of the Special Operations Forces cannot stop at utilizing only existing equipment, rather, it must also employ the various types of more modern weapons in a suitable manner. They must constantly improve their proficiency in the use

of the weapons and means of war with which they have been equipped and actively research and improve their ability to utilize modern technology while intensifying the application of modern technology in order to develop their ability to move far ahead and deliver serious blows and achieve high combat efficiency.

The firm foundation for the attacks by the Special Operations Forces are the battle position of the people's war to defend the fatherland, a position which has been prepared and is constantly being strengthened. This battle position is deployed and built on each level and within each locality, even on the frontline of the fatherland, before war even breaks out. Therefore, regardless of which method of fighting they employ to fight the enemy, regardless of the scale and form of their attacks, the Special Operations Forces must make every effort to utilize the impact of this battle position. To begin with, they can and must rely upon the results of reconnaissance and observation, upon the deployment of the formation, upon the level of preparation of military, technical, material and other factors of the local forces and progress from assessing the enemy, the terrain and mobility routes to selecting targets and times for attacks, utilizing technical forces and weapons, organizing combat support and rear service support and so forth in a rapid, precise and highly effective manner.

In the war of liberation, some special operations units remained for many days in areas under enemy control, fought the enemy continuously and won resounding victories. Some enemy bases were attacked by us three or four times in 1 year and were unable to resist us. A very important part of this success was the fact that these units relied upon the people, were protected and helped by the people and were supplied by the people with information, supplies and assistance in every area. This shows that the effectiveness of attacks is also closely linked to the preparation of battlefields, the preparation of the battle position of the Special Operations Forces in accordance with a unified plan for each area, each battlefield and each level. Within this battle position, the Special Operations Forces not only closely coordinate in every way with the units of the various branches and arms of the military, but also prepare a political base among the local people, prepare combat positions, rear service positions, operational plans, lines of communications and so forth with a view toward insuring that the initiative can be taken in carrying out attacks regardless of the situation and insuring secrecy, surprise and victory.

Applying the art of attack in a highly effective manner and developing this art under the new conditions that exist demand comprehensive high quality on the part of the Special Operations Forces.

Today, our Special Operations Forces are 15 years old. In their 15 years of combat and development, the Special Operations Forces have matured and established a glorious tradition. To fulfill their task in the new stage, the Special Operations Forces must have a clear understanding of the new situation, of the new tasks of the revolution, the army and their branch, of the new elements of the people's war to defend the fatherland and of the new warfare objective of

the armed forces; they must have a full understanding of the new elements of the mode of waging a war, of military strategy, of campaign art and tactics. These are the foundations for building and developing the organization of the branch, improving its equipment, political education, military training, military scientific research and the military technical science of the special branch and improving the command qualifications of cadres and the tactical and technical qualifications of units.

The research of the warfare objective must be carried out in a very thorough, comprehensive, basic and specific manner. Facts have shown that if, even when we face a new, insidious and wicked enemy, we fully assess the enemy, fully assess the specific objective of each battle, we can launch victorious attacks. We cannot stop at a general understanding of the schemes and strategic tricks of the enemy, rather, we must gain an understanding of and analyze the weaknesses and strengths of their tactical and technical activities in the case of each attack and, on this basis, determine our capabilities and method of operation in order to annihilate the enemy, protect ourselves and win resounding victory.

We must strengthen and develop the organization of the Special Operations Forces in a manner consistent with the tasks of the army and the branch, consistent with the military art of a people's war to defend the fatherland and the mode of special operations warfare under modern conditions. The building of the organization must insure that the Special Operations Forces are truly a combat branch, a "well trained special" branch of the regular force, modern and well trained Vietnam People's Army. The effort to build the will to fight and preserve and enhance the tradition of the branch must always cultivate within Special Operations Forces the determination to win victory once they have gone into combat and be worthy of being a branch possessing "unparalleled bravery" as was stated by our National Assembly in praise of the Special Operations Forces in 1976.

One matter of very important significance is that of constantly improving the quality of the special operations detachments and units, improving their political-spiritual quality, military and technical quality, rear service support quality, the quality of their command organization and so forth. To begin with, units and detachments must improve the leadership quality and ability of the party organization and the command quality and qualifications of cadres. Special operations soldiers and cadres must be selected in exact accordance with standards; they must be trained and educated in a truly strict and painstaking manner. They must routinely heighten their sense of organization and insure the implementation of the orders, rules and discipline of the army in a fully voluntary manner. To improve the efficiency of attacks, strengthening and improving equipment in order to insure that the weapons and technical equipment of the branch can attack the enemy from far away with strong firepower and a high degree of accuracy are an indispensable requirement. Technical and tactical training must be highly specialized, must be consistent with the requirements and characteristics of the attacks launched by the Special Operations Forces on land, on water, on the islands, in the mountainous jungles and in the cities as well as with the function

and tasks of the Special Operations Forces on each level, on each battlefield and in each arm of the military. Each soldier, each combat organization and each detachment must be developed in a basic, comprehensive manner so that they can be the masters of themselves and the masters of the situation and display "resourcefulness and daring" and "fight effectively and win a major victory" in every situation.

The special operations military science which was formed in the realities of the nation's two wars of resistance, especially in the resistance against the United States for national salvation, must continue to be developed and improved. Under the light of the military thinking and line of the party and the principles of Vietnamese military science, it has been, is and will become the military science of a combat branch whose attribute is being on the attack. It studies matters regarding the laws and principles involved in the buildup, combat and development of the special operations branch, in the mode of special operations warfare as well as the organization and conduct of attacks by the Special Operations Forces under the modern conditions of the people's war to defend the fatherland. It must truly be a component of military science in the cause of defending and building the socialist Vietnamese fatherland.

Together with developing military science, the Special Operations Forces must also invest more intelligence and effort in the field of military technology. The weapons that the Special Operations Forces used in the past consisted of many types, some modern, some rudimentary, some produced by us and some taken from the enemy. The Special Operations Forces must be proficient in the use of every type of weapon, must be the masters of the weapons with which they have been equipped and must use them in a precise manner. The manufacture of additional suitable weapons, the improvement of existing weapons and developing the modern component of the military technology of the branch so that it develops along scientific, modern lines with unified, reliable technical parameters are very necessary in order to improve the ability of the Special Operations Forces to move far ahead, to fight effectively and insure high effectiveness in attacks and high combat efficiency under the new conditions that exist, under the modern warfare conditions of a war to defend the fatherland.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

REQUIREMENTS OF REAR SERVICE COMBAT OPERATIONS OUTLINED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 82 pp 42-48

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Ta Nhon: "The Principles of Rear Service Work in Combat"]

[Text] Our army's principles of rear service work are general principles in the nature of laws that have been developed from the actual activities involved in providing rear service support to the army in combat, the buildup of the army and its work and production. They are stipulations of practical, universal and permanent value that guide the unified actions of the entire rear service sector and the entire army.

Our army's principles of rear service work fully reflect the revolutionary viewpoints and line, the economic line and the military line of our party in the rear service field. The principles of rear service work in warfare (campaigns and combat) must be consistent with the principles of rear service work, in general, and consistent with military art, campaign art and tactics, in particular. At present, these principles must also reflect the requirements of the people's war to defend the fatherland, reflect the situation and capabilities of the rear services of our country and army in war.

1. Displaying Activism, Initiative and Creativity, Constantly Being Prepared and Making Victory in Combat the Objective of Support Operations

This is the most comprehensive principle guiding the thinking and actions of the rear service sector, a principle that is based on the political task of foremost importance of our army in the new stage, namely, always maintaining combat readiness and fighting victoriously to firmly defend the socialist Vietnamese fatherland.

This principle reflects offensive thinking, reflects the spirit of taking the initiative in destroying the enemy, reflects the viewpoint that rear service work must support the military task. This principle is based on a principle of warfare of ours: fighting when prepared, especially in the war to defend the fatherland. It points out the highest target of support of rear services and the

most basic measure employed to insure that each rear service activity reflects activism, initiative, creativity and constant preparation in order to excellently complete every task. Every effort of the rear services must have supporting victory in campaigns and battles as the highest objective. The results of supporting combat readiness and victory in combat must be used as the most basic measurement of the efficiency of each rear service organization, cadre and personnel.

The tasks of maintaining combat readiness and engaging in combat usually involve very high demands regarding rear service support but our economic and rear service capabilities are limited, consequently, rear service work must always reflect activism, initiative and creativity. It is necessary to make projections, to regularly be prepared and to look ahead. Making good preparations and always being ready to provide support are a very basic requirement in winning victory. Determination and precise plans must be adopted at an early date; many support plans must be adopted, one of which must always be the primary plan; and determined, urgent steps must be taken to organize full implementation but it is also necessary to react in a swift and flexible manner and take the initiative in supplementing or promptly replacing the plan in a manner consistent with the new changes in the situation. In the process of implementation, it is necessary to always fully display offensive thinking, display determination to overcome every difficulty, display one's creativity and tap the creativity of the masses and the entire unit in order to excellently complete the assigned task in every situation.

2. Tapping the Combined Strength of Each Rear Service Force and Each Support Source (In and Outside the Army); Coordinating Local Support Sources with Support from the Upper Levels and Other Places.

This principle reflects the viewpoint concerning combined strength and the people's rear service viewpoint; it guides the most basic mode of rear service support. Because the quantity of rear service materials and technical supplies consumed in warfare is very large and complicated, support requirements are very urgent and there are many unexpected, emergency needs, the rear service sector cannot complete its task if it merely relies upon its own forces, upon one source of support or only employs one method of support. There must be close coordination among the rear service forces on the various levels, the rear services of the various services and branches, the cadres and soldiers within the unit and the sectors and agencies of the state as well as concerned localities. All of the forces mentioned above form an entity within which army rear services play the key role. At the same time, the commander and rear service cadre must know how to compute and utilize the various sources of support on the upper levels, utilize local support and utilize self-production, the practice of economy and the capturing of supplies from the enemy as well as other support sources in a reasonable manner in order to promptly and fully meet warfare needs. Each source occupies an important position, has its own strengths, has its own impact and must be accumulated, protected well and managed and used in an economical and highly

effective manner. In particular, full initiative must be taken in building and using local support forces and sources in areas adjacent to the areas in which combat is occurring while maintaining and utilizing the supplies delivered from the upper levels very well.

In preparing for and providing rear service support, experience has shown that it is necessary to employ the two basic methods (modes) of support (local supplies and supplies sent from other places) to supplement each other for the purpose of achieving a common objective on the basis of the strength of the coordination of local rear services everywhere with the common rear service of the entire country and adjacent rear service bases and on the basis of the material and technical forces provided by the upper levels and other places in order to comprehensively and fully meet rear service needs in combat. Performing the above jobs well manifests the responsibility of the upper levels to the lower levels, the rear line to the frontline and shows that the rear area and rear services of the entire country are wholeheartedly supporting the frontline of the fatherland.

In the new stage, this principle embodies new specifics and requirements regarding the militant alliance on a unified battlefield of the three fraternal countries of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. In order to achieve the greatest possible combined strength on the rear service support front, the rear services of our army have the responsibility of taking the initiative in closely cooperating with the rear services of the friendly armies in order to establish a unified plan for coordinating preparations and rear service support in accordance with the principles of coordinated actions among these states that have been signed in various agreements.

3. Organizing Rear Service Forces in a Manner Consistent with Tasks; Establishing Close Coordination Between Rear Service Work and Support Forces

The organization must always be based on the task; the organization of rear service forces must meet the requirements of rear service work. When talking about organization, we are talking about personnel, equipment, the structure of the organization, responsibilities and working relationships. It involves coordination among personnel, material-technical bases and work methods. Facts have shown that even if we have abundant forces, strength cannot be achieved if they are not organized in an efficient, tight manner.

In campaigns and battles, rear service forces are not organized in the same way at all times and places. The basis for determining the organization is the nature and magnitude of the support task. The basic requirements of rear service work in warfare are to provide prompt, full and precise support in terms of materials, daily needs, military medical services and transportation to combat forces so that they can complete their tasks while actively preparing for subsequent combat missions. The magnitude of support depends upon the different characteristics and natures of each type combat unit (infantry, armored, special operations, air force, navy and so forth) operating under different circumstances and employing different methods of attack.

Rear service equipment must be suited to the requirements of rear service support, must be capable of being transported rapidly and must be gradually mechanized, balanced and coordinated with combat equipment. Today, together with the emergence of new units that possess strong firepower and assault power and possess a high degree of mobility, the rear services must be organized and equipped in such a way that they are able to keep up with the military corps in warfare in order to supply them with materials, supply them with daily essentials and provide medical treatment for the wounded. If they are not provided with prompt support, combat units will rapidly lose their fighting ability and strength.

Although an organization has personnel and equipment, if its structure is not accurately and efficiently determined, such as determining the components of which this structure consists (command and leadership agencies, support units and bases in the various areas of rear service work and so forth) and if its tasks, duties, working relationships and work methods are not defined, it will not possess strength. A strong organization must have a suitable structure, an ample supply of necessary, appropriate equipment, clearly defined tasks and duties and tightly structured work methods and working relationships, which must be skillfully implemented. Therefore, the commander and the heads of each support sector must routinely concern themselves with building, forging and perfecting their organization. In campaigns and in each battle, they must, on the basis of the established combat plan and decision, have a truly firm grasp of the task that they must perform in order to rapidly and effectively build, supplement and strengthen their organization in a suitable manner.

Rear service work is work that is coordinated among many different professional and technical sectors, each of which has different specific requirements; however, all of them have a direct responsibility and coordinate with one another to successfully carry out the common task under the unified guidance of the commander who is directly assisted by the deputy commander in charge of rear services, who is the head of the rear services. In addition, the rear service sector has many different relationships with the upper level, the lower level, the staff, political and technical agencies, the units responsible for providing support, friendly units and the localities. Therefore, establishing the close coordination of all these forces and components is an objective requirement in the completion of tasks. The political foundation for organizing this coordination is the rear service plan and order. Coordination must be organized in a timely, concrete manner and each level and person has the responsibility of maintaining strict coordination discipline.

4. Deploying a Rear Service Battle Position that Is Strong, Mobile and Adjacent to the Front; Taking the Initiative in Protecting Rear Services and Determinedly Fighting the Enemy in Order To Complete the Task

In warfare, the deployment of the rear service battle position is of decisive significance in making good use of the strength of the organization and material-technical bases. An improper deployment will adversely affect the effort to maintain continuous support capabilities and even pose obstacles, especially in

large-scale combat operations coordinated among the various branches and services. Therefore, cadres have the responsibility of thoroughly researching the various aspects of their work and going to the site of the rear service battle position to examine it and specifically determine appropriate positions within the combat formation at which to establish their rear service agencies, units and bases (warehouses of various types, medical facilities for wounded and ill soldiers and so forth), thereby creating a strong position and power and developing the strength of rear service support of combat operations in the most advantageous manner possible.

The rear service battle position must be deployed in such a way that it is strong, mobile and adjacent to the front and must have the purpose of providing good support, protecting itself and being ready to deal with each unexpected change that can occur in warfare. In addition to taking advantage of the terrain and building the necessary trenches and fortifications, importance must be attached to deploying a position that links the support bases of the upper level, the lower level, the sectors, the branches, the services and the localities. Battle positions must be located near main transport routes; efforts must be focused on supporting the basic combat plan and supporting the main task, front and area of operations while being able to rapidly relocate the battle position in accordance with a different combat plan and support a different task, front or area of operations. The rear service battle position must be located near combat units; the rear service units tasked with emergency rescue and technical support must be located near those places that have many wounded soldiers and much equipment in need of repair in order to promptly provide medical treatment to wounded soldiers and recondition equipment.

In the war to defend the fatherland, the deployment of campaign and combat rear services must also be firmly based upon the already prepared rear service battle position of the entire country and each locality.

It is necessary to take the initiative in protecting rear service forces and determinedly fighting the enemy in order to complete the task, maintain forces and protect material-technical bases and lines of communications and transportation in order to support the effort to win victory in combat, with supporting victory in combat being the highest objective. When necessary and when possible, determined efforts must be made to annihilate the enemy in order to complete the task and make a direct contribution to the common victory. When necessary, rear service forces must fight the enemy in order to move forward, must open roads in order to advance. It is necessary to regularly teach forces to be highly vigilant regarding every unexpected situation that might occur, including the possibility of the enemy using nuclear weapons. Through training, rear service cadres and soldiers must be provided with all the fighting skills they need and a thorough understanding of the laws and methods of fighting of the enemy; specific plans must be adopted for protecting the rear area, tightly organizing a unified command and equipping with the necessary, appropriate weapons and equipment. The construction of a system of fortifications and camouflage must be organized; strict discipline

must be exercised with regard to maintaining secrets and guarding against spies; and there must be close combat coordination with the other forces within the area in which the rear service battle position is deployed and along transport routes.

7. Attaching Importance To Managing and Utilizing Each Material and Technical Base as Effectively as Possible

Rear service management is an important aspect of troop management, one that has the purpose of completing the rear service task with high productivity, quality and efficiency and helping to maintain and increase the overall fighting strength of the army. Management is a function that is closely associated with the support function. In actuality, in order to provide good support, there must be good management; these two elements cannot be separated. In warfare, it is even more necessary that these two elements not be separated, rather, they must be closely linked to each other.

Rear service management must be tight, continuous and comprehensive; in campaigns and combat, special importance must be attached to the management of material and technical bases because the quantity of supplies that is consumed is very large and this directly influences the effort to win victory in combat. Attention must be paid to the fact that the modern material and technical bases of the regular force, modern army must be managed scientifically in accordance with policies and standards, in exact accordance with war time orders and regulations. In modern warfare, material and technical bases are a strength that must be managed well in order to fully utilize this strength with the highest possible effectiveness.

Experience has shown that it is necessary to regularly teach and cultivate the concept of respecting and maintaining property, necessary to train each person and unit in how to skillfully utilize, store and maintain the equipment, supplies and technology assigned to them and strictly comply with management regulations. In warfare, the commander on each level must personally command the management of the material and technical bases of the unit and closely guide the management efforts of the lower level. In combat decisions, plans and orders and in the preliminary and final reviews of rear service work, the management of material and technical bases must be taken into consideration. In the utilization of these bases, it is necessary to provide close guidance and inspection, promptly praise and commend good examples, discover deviations in order to correct them and employ suitable forms of discipline regarding acts against property of the state.

8. Utilizing Forces in a Concerted, Selective Manner; Always Maintaining Reserve Forces in Order To Provide Support While Building Up Forces and Continuously Supporting Combat Operations

In commanding combat operations as well as commanding rear service work, the efficient utilization of forces in order to achieve high combat efficiency and

support efficiency is a matter of extreme importance. This is part of the art of the commander, especially when he has limited forces but faces large and complex requirements regarding his task.

The utilization of rear service forces, including rear service material and technical bases, must be concerted and selective. Their use must be concentrated on the primary task, front and area of operation, on the central job at hand, on efforts involving many difficulties and places encountering major difficulties, on key battles, on completing plans for taking advantage of good opportunities and so forth. At the same time, however, it is necessary to maintain a comprehensive point of view and not give light attention to appropriately observing, guiding and organizing forces to support the other fronts, areas of operation and jobs.

In the process of providing support of combat and building up forces, importance must always be attached to building reserve forces. The availability of suitable, mobile reserve forces helps the commander promptly deal with every unexpected situation and, at the same time, provides forces that are ready to be used to support key requirements. When using reserve forces, it is necessary to rapidly organize other reserve forces in order to be ready to provide support in subsequent emergency cases. In view of the fact that rear service capabilities are usually limited and the requirements of tasks are large, the skillful creation of reserve forces is an art, is the measurement of the level of rear service organization and command and, at the same time, expresses the high responsibility of the commander toward rear service support of victory in combat.

Fighting while building our forces is a tradition of our army. However, as regards the combat units and many other sectors within the army, which use the time not spent in combat to build up their forces, the rear service sector does not have any time to build up its forces during which it need not provide support. When infantry forces are being built, the rear service sector must provide support and when infantry forces are engaged in combat, the rear service sector must provide even more concerted support. As combat and combat support become more urgent and continuous, building the sector becomes more necessary. As a support sector, only by building the sector through the support provided in campaigns and combat is it possible for the buildup of the sector to be close to reality, possible to improve the quality of work and create the conditions for the rear service sector to grow in pace with the growth of the army and meet the requirement of continuously supporting combat in every situation.

7. The Upper Level Must Take the Initiative in Supporting the Lower Level; Each Level Must Fulfill Its Function

This requirement is based on the responsibility of the upper level as the level that has more authority and better conditions than the lower level, especially with regard to fully understanding the purposes of the tasks being performed and existing and future material-technical base capabilities. In warfare, it is necessary to emphasize the responsibility of the rear services on the upper

level to insure that the lower level operates as smoothly as possible, to reduce the difficulties and problems of the lower level to one degree or another so that the lower level has the most favorable conditions possible for organizing the implementation of each order. For this reason, in warfare, the upper level has the responsibility of transporting material needs to the lower level and going to the lower level to receive arriving wounded and ill soldiers. On the other hand, it must also view the difficulties of the lower level as difficulties of its own in order to take steps to promptly provide the necessary support.

However, only when each rear service level within the army is assigned a specific task and only when each level performs the jobs assigned to it well can the entire army rear service apparatus operate smoothly. Every job on which the required function is not fulfilled influences, to some degree, the operation of the entire system. Only when the lower level correctly fulfills its stipulated function can the upper level provide convenient support and vice versa; when the upper level supports the lower level in the best possible manner, the lower level has convenient conditions for correctly and fully fulfilling its function. Only in this way is it possible for the rear service forces to form a unified, organic entity and operate in a smoothly coordinated manner reflecting high productivity, high quality and high efficiency. The rear services on the upper level and the rear services on the lower level must be a unified sector as this is the only way to create the combined strength needed to meet each rear service support requirement in combat.

8. Commanding Forces in a Centralized, Timely, Continuous and Specific Manner; Firmly Adhering to Combat Strategy and Focusing on the Area Most in Need of Support

Rear service work as well as combat activities and all other work require a command. The rear service command is a very important factor in coordinating every rear service force and all units and in employing every capability to insure that rear service work meets the objective of supporting victory in combat.

The rear service task in combat is very large: while supporting a campaign or battle, it is also necessary to prepare to support subsequent combat tasks. The magnitude of support is very large and support must be provided on a very urgent basis. Rear service capabilities are limited, many complex sectors and trades are involved, many forces are in the state of organization and these forces are being strengthened or mobilized. As a result, coordination must be tight, especially when there are many services and branches participating and combat requirements are very strict. Because of this, rear service command operations must be centralized, timely, continuous and specific.

The style of command must be thorough and specific, must coordinate education and guidance with the issuing of orders and resolute demands that the lower level strictly comply with these orders in conjunction with creating the conditions needed for the lower level to do so, thereby insuring a high degree of unity and unanimity between the upper level and the lower level in the performance of the common task. To accomplish this, it is first of all necessary for the rear service

commander to have a firm grasp of the combat determination. This is necessary because the objective of the rear service task is to insure victory in combat. The rear service command must be comprehensive but not uniformly deployed. The staff must focus on the central support effort in order to stimulate the development of other jobs and carry them out smoothly. The central, key effort in the entire chain of the system of various jobs depends upon the specific time and place. Ordinarily, special attention must be given to communications and transportation.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

MILITIAMAN LAUDED FOR KILLING FULRO MEMBER

Hanoi TIEN PHONG in Vietnamese 13-19 Jul 82 p 1

[Article by Phung Dac Loi of the Dac Lac Province Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union: "The Feat of Arms of Y Ku"]

[Text] As usual, that morning, as soon as the cock crowed lamps were lighted all over the hamlet. Y Ku, head of the team protecting the hamlet of Y-Ung in the village of Ea Giong, Krong Pach District, Dac Lac Province, went in a circle around the hamlet, carrying out his daily work. He had nearly returned back to his home when he spotted a strange youth emerging from the house of Y Dot (a FULRO member). Y Ku worriedly thought, "Who is that person?" "Why was he present at the house of a reactionary FULRO supporter?" The experience he had gained in years of protection work helped Y Ku conclude with certainty that Y Dot had returned home. Y Dot was a dangerous FULRO member. Since he was 13 he had committed many bad acts. In 1973 he joined FULRO. In 1975, after committing his first crime, he was arrested by the revolution and was sent to a reform camp. He escaped from the camp and continued to commit crimes. He commanded a FULRO band who robbed and kidnapped the people in the hamlet.

Y Ku thought that he could not by himself such an obstinate, wily enemy with many blood debts who was sophisticated in his activities. He decided to rush to the state farm by bicycle to report to the protection unit so that it could capture Y Dot. Y Ku asked a child to keep an eye on the two. The protection unit assigned to Y Ku and another comrade the mission of arresting the enemy at the Ea Giong village intersection. Another team set up an ambush on the road from Phuoc An to Buon Ma Thuot City.

After they arrived at the intersection in Y-Ung hamlet, Y Ku and the other comrade quickly thought up an operational plan. Y Ku concluded that Y Dot would travel on a passenger bus. Except for Y Ku, no one knew that he was a member of FULRO, so he would mix in with the other passengers on the bus.

Five minutes later a white passenger bus from Phuoc An arrived. When it arrived, Y Ku signalled for it to stop. Y Ku jumped aboard the bus, immediately spotted Y Dot, armed an AR.15 at his chest, and said in an assured tone of voice: "You are a member of FULRO. You are under arrest."

When Y Dot got off the bus Y Ku's comrade grabbed a bag he was carrying in his right hand. When they opened the bag they took out a U.S.-made 45 cal. pistol.

Y Dot no longer put up an argument. He resisted arrest and ran away. Y Ku fired a warning shot but he continued to run. Y Ku fired another shot that killed him. Y Dot was dead. That happy news reached Y-Ung village. The villagers were excited and enthusiastic, for a wild animal had been killed and the peaceful lives of the hamlet's people had been protected.

The feat of arms in early May by Y Ku, a 23-year old Youth Union chapter secretary inspired all of the Youth Union members and youths at the Phuoc An state farm. Y Ku said, "That was a feat of arms worthy of the memory of our beloved Uncle Ho's birthday."

That was the third time in two years of working at the state farm that Y Ku had achieved accomplishments in protecting security. The management board of the state farm decided to reward Y Ku with goods valued at thousands of dong.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

READER URGES MORE EFFORTS TO STOP ILLEGAL USE OF POWER

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 23 Jun 82 p 3

[Letters From Readers column by Hoang Minh of Hai Ba Trung Ward: "Firmly Preventing in Time Stealing and Illegal Use of Electric Power"]

[Text] Some people suggest that while today's life is difficult, we should be lenient toward those people who steal electric power for use in illegal production. But these people, in fact, deserve severe punishment because they have "contributed" considerably to making the people's life more difficult.

Let us take an example: in May only, the Electric Power Service and public security force of the municipality for the first time organized phases of control against those people who had stolen electric power for illegal production and seized 72 ice makers and ice cream machines, 7 tire-making molds, 4 mills, 20 electric motors, 25 electric ranges, many electrolyzers used in the making of explosive, etc. (if we compare the above-mentioned items with the existing machines that are being used illegally, they are quantitatively meaningless). However, with only these pieces of equipment, the people whose work was illegal had stolen 224 kilowatts of power every hour. In April and May, we lost 112,000 kilowatts. This amount of electric power could have been enough for 2,500 families to use in normal activities for a month, or for the entire network of street lights to work after dark for half a month, or for the towels and handkerchiefs enterprise to operate in half a year, or the pharmaceutical enterprise in a quarter; with the same amount of electric power, we can operate machines to manufacture 200,000 meters of cotton materials, or 1.1 million athletic shirts, or 100,000 pairs of plastic slippers, or 1,800 tons of soap, 100 tons of paper, etc.

The point that is being made is this: the Electric Power Service must coordinate its work with that of the public security force and the sectors concerned to continue organizing phases of control on a wider scale in order to prevent in time stealing and illegal use of electric power and thus to contribute to reducing economic difficulties, fighting losses of income for the state and public order, as well as maintaining solidarity among city residents.

The people are hoping that the Electric Power Service, the public security force and other forces of the municipality will continue to launch offensives against this ill.

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

SPECULATORS SENTENCED TO MANY YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 23 Jun 82 p 2

[Article: "Severe Punishment for Gold Speculators, Violators of Foreign Exchange Management Policy"]

[Text] In 1980, in the area of Ta Hien and Hang Buom Streets many cases of dealing in gold, silver and dollars frequently took place. Through its investigation, the public security organ searched the home of Nguyen Thi Lien at 122 Hang Buom Street and confiscated 50 U.S. banknotes of the 100-dollar denomination and a quantity of illegal goods like gold, sweeteners, etc. It also searched the home of Nguyen Thi Mui at 23 Hang Khoai Street and confiscated more than 18 lang [unit of weight equivalent to 37.8 grams] of gold and other properties.

Statements of accomplices and informers revealed the following: In the last few years, Nguyen Thi Mui received every month hundreds of thousands of dong in foreign currencies and secretly carried gold abroad. Dealers gave her the nickname of the "green and red queen" (specialized in dealing in dollars and gold). Her family became very rich and spent money freely.

Nguyen Thi Lien was Nguyen Thi Mui's customer.

This was the biggest case of gold speculation and violation of the foreign exchange management policy ever brought to trial. The defendants' criminal acts were very dangerous as they directly caused harm to national security. While our state was still encountering many economic difficulties and its income in foreign currencies was still very little, they took advantage of the loopholes in management to bring foreign currencies onto our market, thus making the rate of exchange on the free market very high, our currency lose its value and the economic order suffer from adverse effects.

Imposing severe punishment on the gold speculators and violators of the foreign exchange management policy, the Municipal People's Court, at its recent preliminary sitting, sentenced:

- Nguyen Thi Mui to 15 years of imprisonment and a fine of 50,000 dong, with confiscation of more than 18 lang of gold and the house on Lien Tri Street (which had been bought with illegally-acquired money).

- Nguyen Thi Lien to 8 years of imprisonment and a fine of 50,000 dong, with confiscation of more than 11 lang of gold and 50 banknotes of 100-dollar denomination.

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CSO: 4209/459

BRIEFS

DELEGATION ATTENDS MEXICAN CONFERENCE--Hanoi, 30 Aug (VNA)--A delegation of the Vietnam General Department of Tourism led by Nguyen Viet, acting general director, attended a recent world conference on tourism in Acapulco, Mexico. It was received by R. L. Alegria, president of the conference and Mexican minister of tourism, who said: The government and the entire people of Mexico side with Vietnam. We admire the Vietnamese people's courageous struggle to defend their country in contribution to safeguarding of world peace. It is an honour and a principle for Mexico to continue supporting Vietnam. [Text] [OW300753 Hanoi VNA in English 0727 GMT 30 Aug 82]

FARMERS DELEGATION VISITS CZECHOSLOVAKIA--Hanoi, 2 Sep (VNA)--A delegation of the Central Preparatory Committee for the Congress of Collective Farmers led by the Committee Chairman Ngo Duy Dong, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, paid a friendship visit to Czechoslovakia from 18-31 August. During its visit, the delegation was received by Julius Varga, member of the Central Committee of the CP of Czechoslovakia [CPC] and head of the Agriculture Committee of the Party CC and Pavol Jonas, alternate member of the Central Committee of the CPC, and president of the Czechoslovak Collective Peasants Society. The delegation toured several agricultural institutions and places of historical and cultural interests. [Text] [OW030027 Hanoi VNA in English 1503 GMT 2 Sep 82]

CSO: 4220/335

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

PREPARATION FOR PARTY CONGRESS NOTED

Committee Discussion

Vung Tau VUNG TAU-CON DAO in Vietnamese 17 Jun 82 p 1

[Article by Minh Hang: "Special Zone Party Committee Discusses Preparations for Second-Phase Congresses of Party Organizations at all Levels and for a Campaign of Political Activities"]

[Text] The Special Zone Party Organization Executive Committee recently met to discuss preparations for the holding of second-phase congresses of party organizations at all levels and for the launching of a campaign of political activities aimed at studying the Fifth Party Congress Resolution and discussing its implementation.

The conference heard Le Minh Ha, member of the Special Zone Party Committee Standing Committee and chairman of the Organizational Committee, and Do Quoc Hung, member of the Special Zone Party Committee Standing Committee and chairman of the Special Zone Propaganda and Training Committee, report on the theme of the conference convened by the party Central Committee Secretariat to discuss the above-mentioned problems. The Party Organization Executive Committee held a debate to grasp the views and directives of the Central Committee and discussed ways to carry them out in the locality. During the debate, care was taken to find ways to closely coordinate the above-mentioned tasks during the same period of time in order to positively prepare for the second-phase party congresses at all levels and to enable them to obtain a good result.

To carry out the Central Committee policy, it would be necessary to launch a campaign of political activities from high to low echelons and to hold congress at all levels from low to high ones. The conference worked out a program and schedule for carrying out these tasks in each specific period of time. The conference assigned to party committee members at various echelons the task of further disseminating the Fifth National Party Congress Resolution, preparing to draw up reports and projects on tasks, reporting on party building activities and so forth.

The conference confirmed the existence of favorable conditions for a satisfactory implementation of the above-mentioned tasks and simultaneously pointed out new difficult and complex circumstances. Noteworthy was the need to coordinate and step up all local tasks; since the fulfillment of the state plan for the first 6 months of the year was meeting with difficulties, each level and sector should take realistic measures to accomplish it. The conference reminded cadres, party members, manual and office workers of the need to heighten their sense of responsibility, to participate actively in the above-mentioned tasks, to display unity, identity of views, loyalty and true co-operation in doing all jobs and to overcome negative thoughts and acts prejudicial to solidarity and to the conduct of the common affairs of the party and state.

Editorial

Vung Tau VUNG TAU-CON DAO in Vietnamese 17 Jun 82 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Some Major Tasks Preparatory to the First Congresses of Party Organizations at all Levels (Second Phase)"]

[Text] The First Congresses of Party Organizations at all levels (Second Phase) in the Special Zone are of special importance. Through a deep understanding of the Resolution of the Fifth National Party Congress and that of the Central Committee and by making self-criticism and criticism, developing democracy and gathering up the intellect of the collective, the Congresses of Party Organizations at all levels must try to draw up sound resolutions of a revolutionary and scientific nature with a view to correctly solving the pressing key problems in their own localities. The principle of democratic centralism must be applied properly and the criteria for the qualifications and abilities of party members at each level must serve as a basis for the election of truly worthy executive committees of party organizations. Through the preparations for and the holding of congresses, it is necessary to strengthen the solidarity and unification of party organizations, to overcome negative aspects, to heighten the combat power of party bases and to launch a mass movement to carry out the party organizations' missions satisfactorily.

To ensure the quality of the Congresses of Party Organizations at all levels, we must make good overall preparations. Meanwhile, we need to modernize the party organizations' method of reporting on the situation and planning tasks. While holding fast to the basic issues mentioned in the Fifth National Party Congress Resolution and to the political mission of the special zone, each installation must take the actual situation in its own unit into account and examine it carefully in order to be able to set forth tasks and draw up a tight, correct and realistic implementation plan including norms and time limits for the execution of tasks. It is necessary to concentrate on the principal and urgent affairs of each locality and to do one's best to avoid formalism and vague outlines. The reports and self-criticism made by party committees at various echelons must be prepared adequately and must deal boldly with realities and with the application of party policies and principles on activities. In the preparatory process, gradual steps must be taken to select party committee members at various echelons. To meet the requirements

of the political mission and the need to reinforce party committee echelons from the qualitative point of view, we must modernize our concept of the criteria for party committee members at various echelons and of the structure of various party committee echelons, provide guidance for the fulfillment of the party organizations' missions and ensure the continuity and succession of each party committee echelon.

It is necessary to specifically assign the above-mentioned tasks to various party committee echelons and to perform regular inspection and exhortation. There is an immediate need to closely coordinate these tasks with the political activity campaign designed to study and discuss the implementation of the Fifth Party Congress Resolution. We are going to launch this campaign of political activities to actively prepare for the second-phase Congresses of Party Organizations at all levels and create favorable political and ideological conditions and bases for strengthening the various party committee echelons. This campaign will be conducted from high to low echelons. Party committees at various echelons will guide cadres and party members--especially the responsible cadres at various echelons and in different sectors--to enable them to grasp the basic theme of the [Party] Congress documents and the Central Committee Resolution and to achieve a high degree of unanimity on these matters. Debates must be held and views contributed to the critical report and the draft action program to be presented by the Special Zone Party Committee at the First Congress of the Special Zone Party Organization (Second Phase). Constructive ideas must be expressed concerning the various party committee echelons' reviews of their leadership task; each party member will then refer to his knowledge of the current situation and examine his implementation of party policies and state laws over the past few years as well as his effort to preserve his revolutionary qualities and increase his working capacities. In this process, he will heighten his revolutionary qualities and working capacities. During the period of self-criticism and criticism of party committees at various echelons, their members must review their own leading functions, assigned duties, revolutionary qualities and working manners. Party chapters must contribute their views to the self-criticism made by the cadres and party members who are slated to be chosen for admission into party committees at various echelons.

It is by carrying out the above-mentioned tasks--especially through the self-criticism and criticism made by party committee members at various echelons and comrades who are chosen and slated for admission into party committees at various echelons--that we will adequately prepare for the election of party committees at various echelons. Members of party committees at various echelons must be comrades who fully agree to the domestic and foreign policy of the party, who are loyal, honest, just and impartial, who do not place individual, partial and local interests above those of the collective, state and entire party, who are conversant with the tasks for which they are responsible, who have a specialized and professional knowledge required by the nature of the posts they are occupying and who are able to organize and execute tasks and to muster other cadres and party members so as to direct affairs according to the jobs they [party committee members] are holding, thereby really contributing to the collective activities of party committees at various echelons.

The effectiveness of task execution and the implementation of the party and state policies must be taken into account in assessing the qualifications and abilities of cadres and in correctly applying the party policy toward cadres. It is inadvisable to examine the [working] process cursorily without taking care to see whether a party committee member at a given echelon has assured fulfillment of the task entrusted to him.

A satisfactory execution of the above-mentioned tasks will ultimately enable the Congresses of Party Organizations at all levels to reap a good result. In carrying out these tasks, we must, therefore, be aware of the need to work in close coordination and to complete them before starting the second-phase congresses at the grassroots level. By making adequate preparations in the political and ideological field and concerning the revolutionary action program and the personnel problem, the Congresses of Party Organizations at the basic level and of Party Chapters will satisfactorily carry out the tasks assigned to their respective level and, at the same time, will express critical views about the leadership exercised by the higher level, thus contributing to the result of the First Congress of the Special Zone Party Organization (Second Phase).

9332

CSO: 4209/436

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

CIRCULAR ISSUED ON ELIMINATING UNQUALIFIED PARTY MEMBERS

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 23 Jun 82 p 2

[Article: "Standing Committee of Municipal VCP Committee Issues Circular on 'Concentrating Leadership on Firmly Expelling Unqualified Members From the Party and Praising in Time the Party Members Who Have Strived Hard' "]

[Text] The party committee echelons have lately concentrated leadership on carrying out Circular 26 of the Standing Committee of the Municipal VCP Committee on the phase of activities aimed at raising the quality of the communists, reviewing the year of 1981 and periodically examining and classifying all party members.

Some of the echelons at the primary level have relied on the results of such a classification to adopt plans and measures to continue raising the quality of party members and to firmly expel the unqualified members from the party.

However, in many party bases, although the unqualified members were named after classification and examination had been done, no firm action has been taken to carry out the expulsion. On the other hand, praising the party members who strived hard has been quite late.

Therefore, the Standing Committee of the Municipal VCP Committee issues a circular to remind the party committee echelons, particularly the ward, district and city committees, of the need to concentrate leadership on the following work so as to accomplish it before the 9th Congress of Municipal Party Organization Delegates (second round) is held:

1. To expel immediately from the party those members who have been determined unqualified and to take back their membership cards, if cards have been issued to them.

Expelling unqualified members from the party must be done with firmness, but various forms can be flexibly applied. The form of purging from the party must be applied to those who have committed serious shortcomings. As to the persons who have shown a poor party concept and failed to carry on party activities

without legitimate reasons, delete their names from the lists of party members. As to other cases, depending on the degree of seriousness of their shortcomings advise them to withdraw from the party or accept their letters of withdrawal from the party (or accept their orally-expressed idea of withdrawal). As to those who have been determined unqualified but failed to voluntarily withdraw from the party, delete their names from the lists of party members. In the case of those party members who since joining the party have been striving hard to fulfill their task but have not made any progress in spite of assistance from the collectives and, because of very poor capacities and background, have not become as good as or better in terms of concept and action than the masses, who do not have confidence in them, the party organization at the primary level must advise them to withdraw from the party. At the same time, in the announcement of acceptance of their withdrawal, it can affirm their past endeavor and urge them to continue maintaining good relationships with the party and actively implementing the party positions and policies after having left the party.

2. As to those party members whom the primary-level organizations have classified as unqualified but entitled to being retained for a while to get some education, this is the way to deal with them: To issue membership cards to those members who have gone through the period of education, during which issuance of cards was postponed, and made evident progress. If there has been no progress as they remain unqualified, they must be expelled from the party; in the case there are matters that remain unclear and require further consideration of qualifications, the party organizations concerned must urgently review these cases to reach some conclusion.

The time needed for education and consideration in the case of retained members must not exceed 6 months. Every month the primary party organizations must review their efforts in order to be able to make clear conclusions at the end of the 6-month period.

3. Along with expelling from the party the unqualified members, the party committee echelons must assume leadership over praising the ones who have strived hard and make a list of the party members who have strived brilliantly for the Standing Committee of the Municipal VCP Committee to praise; on the other hand, they must assume leadership over selecting and praising the strong party bases.

Praising party members and bases must be linked with plans for organizing learning, developing priorities in every primary party organization and chapter and using typical examples to encourage party members to learn and to strive to follow the good examples, for the purpose of training and educating party members and perfecting party bases.

4. The ward, district and city party committee echelons must concentrate on leadership so as to be able to complete the issuing of membership cards in the party bases before the second round of congress is held; in order to do so they must

concentrate leadership on consolidating the remaining party bases. In the latter, while membership cards are issued, there must be guidance and strict control by the superior party committee echelons. Work teams must be set up wherever it is necessary to do so to assist the primary party committees in ensuring good results from the card-issuing job.

Tight and strict control must be strengthened in order to make the expulsion of unqualified party members an accurate and serious job. This will help prevent the expulsion of good members and those who have the spirit of fighting righteously.

From now until the congress of municipal party organizations is held, once a month all ward, district and city VCP committees and the party committee echelons subordinate to them must report to the Standing Committee of the Municipal VCP Committee on any positive results obtained from doing the above-mentioned work. The organizing committees, propaganda and training committees and Control Committee of the Municipal VCP Committee are responsible for assisting the Standing Committee of the Municipal VCP Committee in providing guidance, control and supervision over implementation of this circular and organizing a number of control teams to check the classification of party members, expulsion of unqualified members and praising of the outstanding party bases.

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CSO: 4209/459

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

USE OF ELECTRICITY FURTHER RESTRICTED IN URBAN HANOI

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 24 Jun 82 p 4

[Text of notice of Hanoi Electric Power Service released by the Commerce Bureau of Hoan Kiem Ward: "Notice of Electric Power Service"]

[Text] " Because of very warm weather, in order to ensure stable power supply for residents of urban Hanoi in their daily activities in the present situation of power shortage, the Hanoi Electric Power Service must:

" 1. Prohibit the making of ice cream and ice by organs, enterprises, collectives and individuals (except the installations of the Foods and Services Corporation).

" 2. Cut off total power supply to enterprises of categories 2 and 3.

" 3. Prohibit operations of industrial enterprises and handicraft cooperatives (except the state-determined key locations) for production during the peak evening hours (from 1700 to 2200 hours). The Hanoi Electric Power Service will not consider any exceptional cases.

"We hereby notify all organs, enterprises and handicraft cooperatives of the above decision. Any violation by any installation will compel our service to handle it in accordance with current regulations. "

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CSO: 4209/459

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

GUIDELINES ON 1982 GOODS DISTRIBUTION POLICY ISSUED

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 23 Jun 82 pp 2, 4

[Guidelines issued by the Department of Commercial Policies and Technical Organization in the Ministry of Home Trade: "About the Policy for Distribution of Goods Supplied in Undetermined Quantities in 1982 to Workers and Civil Servants"]

[Text] On 12 June 1982 the Ministry of Home Trade issued Circular No 1551 NT/CS providing guidelines for the distribution of six lines of goods supplied in undetermined quantities to workers and civil servants in 1982.

On the basis of present stocks and after agreement has been reached with the Vietnam Confederation of Trade Unions, the ministry has the following guidelines for the distribution of goods in undetermined quantities at supplied prices to workers and civil servants in 1982:

1. Tea: Every worker, civil servant (including retirees and disabled persons) and college, vocational middle school and apprenticeship student can buy each month 50 grams of grade 3 or grade 4 tea.
 2. Rush mats: Every four workers, civil servants (including retirees and disabled persons) and college, vocational middle school and apprenticeship students can buy a mat in 1982. Due to fact that mats of large size are of limited quantities, they are distributed on a priority basis to workers and civil servants having a family of their own. As to students, they are given mats of individual size.
 3. Bicycle tires and tubes: Every worker and civil servant (including retirees and disabled persons) can buy a set of bicycle tire and tube in the 2 years of 1981-1982 (this includes the tires and tubes that were supplied and sold in 1981). As to village and subward cadres, every two of them can buy a set of tire and tube in 1982.
- Those workers and civil servants who have monthly public transportation passes or ride in automobiles of their organ or enterprise everyday to and from work cannot buy bicycle tires and tubes.

4. Rainproof nylon: Every 6 workers and civil servants (including retirees and disabled persons) can buy 1 piece (1 x 1.4 meters) in 1982. In organs and enterprises priority distribution must be to those who normally work outdoors or far away from home.

5. Vacuum bottles: Every 19 workers and civil servants (including retirees and disabled persons) can buy 1 bottle (without metal outer case) of 1.5-liter size or 1 complete vacuum bottle (with metal outer case) of 1.5-liter size (bottles are sold at supplied prices and metal outer cases at commercial-business prices). Priority distribution must be to those workers and civil servants who have small children.

6. Small portable fans: Because of very small stocks, the ministry cannot distribute them to all localities but only a number of key areas and projects where electric power is available and living quarters seriously lack ventilation. After having received the distribution norms set for them, the commercial services must provide guidelines as to the percentage of people to be able to buy these fans.

To maintain good distribution of the lines of goods being supplied in undetermined quantities in 1982, the ministry reminds all commercial services of the following points:

- Only two lines of goods -- tea and rush mats -- are distributed to college, vocational middle school and apprenticeship students. But in the case of workers and civil servants being sent to school to study, they are still included for distribution of all six lines of goods mentioned above.

- Village cadres can buy only bicycle tires and tubes. Subward cadres can buy the lines of goods being supplied in undetermined quantities just as workers and civil servants can.

- Standard A and B cadres (monthly salaries of 170 dong or more), including retirees and disabled persons, are also included for distribution of the lines of goods being supplied in undetermined quantities just like other workers and civil servants. Bicycle tires and tubes particularly are not distributed to these A and B cadres because they ride in small automobiles to and from work.

- As to the armed forces (except the public security force), the ministry will directly distribute the goods funds to the Rear Service General Department. Consequently, the commercial services no longer have to consider supplying the armed forces (troops) with various lines of goods.

The commercial services must let the trade-union federation know the quantities of goods distributed to them by the ministry in the entire year and in each phase and at the same time coordinate with the trade-union federation to carry out the distributing job and to announce the criteria for distribution in the entire year and

in each phase. As an immediate thing to do, since the goods funds are not sufficient yet and some quantities of goods must be kept aside for purchases of grain, foods and agricultural products, we cannot wait until we have enough goods to distribute but rather distribute any goods that are made available and in any quantities we may have and must announce the distribution criteria for the entire year so as to inform all workers and civil servants in advance of such criteria.

In the case a locality must use all of its goods for purchases and consequently cannot distribute any goods to workers and civil servants right away, it must consider owing goods to them and have plans for compensating them for these goods in accordance with the set criteria as the ministry has specified in this document in 1982.

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CSO: 4209/459

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

CAUSES OF FOOD PRICE HIKE REVEALED

Vung Tau VUNG TAU-CON DAO in Vietnamese 17 Jun 82 pp 2, 4

[Article by Nguoi Tieu Dung [Consumer] in Economic Tribune Column: "Why Have Prices of Some Fresh Foods Risen on the Free Market?"]

[Text] At present, the free market prices of some fresh foods--especially meat and fish--have increased by 30 to 50 percent and have even nearly tripled as compared with 3 or 4 months ago.

At the markets in Vung Tau, we have seen the emergence of many negative practices. In particular, the habit of posting up price lists and selling at the posted prices is almost extinct. Since commodities are consumed in greater quantities on holidays and Sundays, their prices are usually 5 to 10 percent higher than on weekdays. On many days, fresh foods are abundant in the free market but their prices do not exactly reflect the actual situation because private traders try to maintain and raise prices and to create a false shortage of goods. The price of a kilogram of meat may fluctuate between 10 and 20 dong on the same day or 2 successive days. On inquiry, we found that private traders have tried harder and harder to make a greater profit. Though the current price of a kilogram of pork on the hoof is only about 20 dong higher than in the past, private traders charge 40 to 50 dong more when selling a kilogram of [dressed] meat. Meanwhile, the agencies in charge of market management have not yet positively coordinated prices in order to work out an appropriate price scale and direct private traders to sell at the fixed prices.

Beside the above-mentioned causes, there are other objective ones which have boosted the prices of these commodities. The prices of various types of food in the special zone are partly influenced by the free market prices in the neighboring provinces. In general, the prices of these goods will rise on the free market on the days meat and fish are not sold at the food shops or are sold by them at the supply and business prices but in small quantities. A decisive factor in the meat and fish price hike is the fact that the volume of production is still small and cannot yet meet the consumption demand of cadres and people, especially on holidays and Sundays when thousands of tourists from everywhere rush to Vung Tau to have a summer holiday and sea bathing. Moreover, fish supply is of a seasonal character and

there has been a rise in the prices of breeding animals and livestock feed. Investigations by the Agricultural, Forest and Marine Products Service have revealed that the number of hogs, cattle and poultry has decreased as compared with 1 October 1981, which has diminished the sources of goods.

Under the present circumstances, our supplies to cadres and manual and office workers have met only about 30 to 50 percent of their need for consumer goods. The rising prices of foodstuffs on the free market have badly influenced the life of cadres and manual and office workers, especially those working at administrative and professional agencies. The only way [to solve this problem] is to help cadres and manual and office workers intensify animal husbandry to partly meet their need for foods used in their daily meals. The current difficulties in daily life can be removed only if the agencies in charge of distribution and circulation manage the free market more strictly and try to supply fresh foods regularly to consumers.

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CSO: 4209/436

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

BRIEFS

TELEVISION SETS FOR SALE--The Metals and Chemicals Corporation is selling on a purchasing-freely basis 20-inch Friendship television sets at the electric machines store, 12 Trang Thi Street, at the price of 9,000 dong apiece. [Text]
[Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 23 Jun 82 p 4] 5598

CSO: 4209/459

AGRICULTURE

NAM BO PROVINCES PUSH AGRICULTURAL COLLECTIVIZATION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 8 Aug 82 pp 1,4

[VNA News Release: "Provinces and Municipalities of Former Nam Bo Continue to Develop and Consolidate Production Collectives and Agricultural Cooperatives; In 6-Months Period, 2,887 Additional Production Collectives Set Up; More Than 28,000 Production Solidarity Teams Organized"]

[Text] Recently there have been new developments and advances in the socialist transformation of the provinces and municipalities in the former Nam Bo region.

Since the beginning of the 1981-1982 winter-spring season the provinces and municipalities have expanded the contracting out of final output while consolidating the production collectives and cooperatives, and educating and encouraging the peasants to enter onto the path of collective production. Between January and June 1982 the localities organized 2,887 additional production collectives, an increase of nearly 60 percent since the end of 1981; increased the number of production collectives to more than 7,700; and set up 182 additional cooperatives. The localities did a better job of organizing production solidarity teams, work rotation teams, work exchange teams, etc., which help one another in production and life while becoming accustomed to the collective way of production and serving as the basis for the cooperativization movement. In all, the former Nam Bo region has organized more than 28,000 production solidarity teams.

A number of localities have rather strong, relatively solid cooperativization movements and do a good job of combining the organizing of production solidarity organizations with the contracting-out of production and using the contracting-out of production to advance the cooperativization movement, develop production, and consolidate the collectives.

During the first 6 months of this year Hau Giang Province organized 1,000 additional production collectives, double the number at the end of 1981. In addition to organizing 500 additional production collectives, Tien Giang Province also paid attention to a campaign to bring nearly all peasants into production solidarity teams and work rotation, work exchange teams.

In all localities there are districts and villages which do a good job of transforming agriculture. Many advanced production collectives have gained much valuable experience in the cooperativization movement and in management, especially in

contracting out final output in agriculture. Many districts have good cooperativization movements and the ratio of collectivized peasant households and land is high. In Long Phu District, Hau Giang Province, 60 percent of the households have entered production collectives and 60 percent of the cultivated land has been collectivized. Hoc Mon District in Ho Chi Minh City has brought 50 percent of its land into production collectives. Cai Be District in Tien Giang District previously had no collectives but has now organized hundreds of production collectives, accompanied by the contracting out of final output.

Since the beginning of the 1981-1982 winter-spring season much better results have been attained in consolidating production collectives and cooperatives since the beginning of the 1981-1982 winter-spring season, thanks to the combining of the expansion of the contracting out of final output with the development and consolidation of the cooperativization movement. Many peasant households have voluntarily applied to enter production collectives. Many production solidarity teams have combined to form production collectives. Many people who previously requested permission to leave the collectives have now requested permission to return.

In general, the cooperativization movement in the provinces and municipalities of the former Nam Bo region has made new advances and created conditions for more rapid development in the future. However, there are still a number of deficiencies and weaknesses in the cooperativization movement, such as the lack of uniform development in the localities in the region and in the districts and villages. Even in the provinces with good movements there are districts in which the transformation has been slow, and some villages have not yet organized any collectives. A number of places have made the contracting out of final output a method for encouraging peasants to enter the collectives but have lightly regarded the other important tasks, such as political-ideological education, have not carried out land readjustments, and have not done a good job of collectivizing the principal means of production. Therefore, a number of newly organized collectives have not fulfilled the requirements and their quality is low. Some places pursue quantity and do not yet pay adequate attention to the quality of collectives.

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CSO: 4209/467

AGRICULTURE

GREATER EFFORT TO RESOLVE GRAIN PROBLEM URGED

Hanoi NONG NGHIEP in Vietnamese 20 Jun 82 pp 1,7

[Article: "Endeavor to Resolve the Grain Problem"]

[Text] On 1 June 1982 the Council of Ministers issued a resolution on the major directions, missions, policies, and measures for resolving the nation's grain problem during the coming period. We would like to discuss a number of especially important matters to be kept in mind when studying and implementing that resolution.

Self-Reliantly Resolving the Grain Problem

The resolution pointed out that grain is a matter of strategic importance with regard to production, construction, combat, and life. In that regard the greatest difficulty we are now facing is balancing grain in the state sector in the north, which can be resolved only by the application of the most positive measures.

Directive No 120CT/TW, dated 26 October 1981, of the Political Bureau, stated that "In order to take the initiative under all circumstances, there must be a profound, basic transformation in the sectors and echelons and among the cadres, party members, and people, so that they strive to resolve the nation's grain problem by domestic forces, on the basis of promoting production, stepping up mobilization in order to place most of the commodity grain in the hands of the state, promptly shift grain from surplus areas to deficit areas, and closely manage distribution in a spirit of absolute economizing, within the realm of actual capability and domestic production and mobilization, without relying on the outside."

Strive to Balance Grain and Food Products in the Sphere of Each District and Province

In accordance with the above-mentioned basic direction, the State Planning Commission must, along with the sectors and localities, carefully calculate production, mobilization, distribution, and consumption, and balance grain and food in the sphere of each district and province, in order to both meet the rational needs of the local people and fulfill the annual and seasonal plans for delivery to the central echelon, in order to meet the needs of the armed forces, the large municipalities, and the concentrated industrial zones, aid the rural areas which have crop failures, and gradually increase the national reserves.

It is necessary to continually tie in grain with food products in order to improve the people's diet. With regard to grain, it is necessary to pay attention to both rice and subsidiary food crops; with regard to produce it is necessary to emphasize the various kinds of vegetables and legumes (especially soybeans); and it is necessary to pay all-out attention to promoting the processing of subsidiary food crops and produce.

On the basis of the specific economic conditions, it is necessary to determine appropriate production directions and plans for the various kinds of grain and food products, principally in improving the local diet (including the diet of the armed forces, in places in which conditions permit). When there is a shortage of rice, additional subsidiary food crops should be consumed; when there is a shortage of grain, additional vegetables, fruits, and food products should be produced to make up for the deficit. We must concentrate on doing a good job of resolving the food problem, while also being concerned with comprehensively developing agriculture, with emphasis on the areas growing industrial crops, medicinal crops, and fruit trees on a concentrated basis, in accordance with state plans.

The specific struggle goals set for each type of province and municipality are as follows:

In addition to production to meet the local needs (including those of the central-level organs, enterprises, and units in the locality) and build up the necessary reserve stocks, the nation's key rice-growing provinces (in the Mekong Delta and in the Red River Delta) must step up the production and mobilization in foodstuffs in order to turn over increasingly larger quantities to the central echelon.

-- Provinces which previously produced only enough for their own consumption must make progress so that they can contribute to the central echelon and build up the local reserve stocks.

-- Provinces which previously failed to produce enough for their own needs year after year must make progress so that they can at least partly meet the local needs. The central echelon will only meet the needs of the main-force armed forces.

-- Municipalities and concentrated industrial zones directly aided by the central echelon must closely manage distribution and consumption, and also have plans and measures for achieving intensive cultivation, increasing yields, and increasing the number of growing seasons on all food-growing areas in the localities; organize, guide, and assist people in non-agricultural occupations (especially in areas outside the municipalities and cities) so that they can participate in the production of foodstuffs at levels appropriate to the actual conditions of each place, in order to reduce the quantity the central echelon must send in from elsewhere.

Some Principal Policies and Measures

In 1982 it is necessary to fully implement the policies and measures for developing agriculture in order to fulfill and overfulfill the over-all grain output norm of 16 million tons in paddy equivalent (with paddy accounting for 13 million tons).

In the immediate future, it is necessary to go all-out to meet the following principal requirements:

-- Ensuring the prompt supplying of sufficient quantities of FOL for soil preparation, irrigation pumps, and the milling and transporting of grain, with concentration on the areas with high-yield acreage which are capable of increasing the number of growing seasons and opening up wasteland in order to expand their acreage.

-- Endeavoring to promptly provide adequate amounts of the various kinds of imported fertilizers, accompanied by increasing the domestic production of phosphate fertilizer, and overcoming all difficulties to organize rapid shipments to the localities and bases in order to promptly serve the seasonal schedule.

-- Seeking all ways to import and increase the production of insecticides for rice and the principal kinds of subsidiary food crops, industrial crops, and produce crops.

-- Closely guiding the work of countering drought, guarding against and fighting storms, floods, and waterlogging during the coming months.

The 1982 Grain Mobilization Norm: 3 Million Tons in Paddy Equivalent

It is necessary to fulfill the 1982 grain mobilization norm (calculated for the grain year) of from 2.8 million to 3 million tons in paddy equivalent. (For the north, from 1 million to 1.1 million tons; for the coastal, central, and Central Highlands provinces, 350,000 tons; and for the provinces of the former Nam Bo region, from 1.4 to 1.5 million tons).

It is necessary to employ all economic, administrative, and educational measures, with principal emphasis on political education combined with economic measures, while also using administrative measures to the proper extent with regard to people who deliberately refuse to fulfill their grain obligations to the state.

The policy of stabilizing the grain obligations of agricultural cooperatives, production collectives, and peasant households throughout the nation must be implemented.

That stabilized obligation norm includes agricultural taxes collected in accordance with statutes and an obligatory grain sales norm.

With regard to agricultural taxes, the Ministry of Finance must urgently complete its draft of the new agricultural tax statutes that was submitted for review by the Political Bureau and approved by the National Assembly in June 1982, so that those statutes can be implemented beginning with the 1982 10th month season. At present it is necessary to concentrate on collecting the full amount of taxes scheduled for collection this year and the remaining tax debts owed for past years. Taxes absolutely must not be accumulated. Places which suffer serious crop losses will be considered for exemptions promptly and in correct accordance with policies.

Purchasing within the obligatory norm must be carried out by means of two-way economic contracts at state guidance prices. The materials and merchandise funds set aside for the requisition-purchasing of grain must be planned from the central level down to the provincial and district levels. At the district level the grain sector, along with the materials-merchandise supply organ, sign seasonal or annual (divided into seasons) contracts with the collective production units and the peasant households which guarantee the prompt supplying of POL, fertilizer, insecticides, and mechanized services (soil preparation, irrigation pumping, rice husking, rice milling, etc.), according to the rational needs of the producers and the actual capabilities of the state. Units and producers capable of doing so must fulfill their obligations immediately. If they lack capital the State Bank will lend them capital to pay for the materials and goods supplied them. The debts will be paid at harvest time. At harvest time the collective units and peasant households, in addition to paying all taxes and debts, are responsible for selling grain to the state in accordance with contracts and with stabilized obligatory norms assigned by the People's Committee.

In the event of a natural disaster, the village People's Committee reports to the district People's Committee and recommends tax exemptions, in accordance with the policy, and the rational adjustment of the obligatory sales norms of each unit.

Localities which have not implemented two-way contracts must resolutely do so, beginning with the 1982 10th month season. Places which have recently signed two-way contracts but have not yet liquidated them must now liquidate them in a manner that is fair to both sides. The localities that have contracted to buy rice from families must collect the full amount of such rice.

The state mechanized services organizations (the tractor stations, the pumping stations, the rice husking and milling installations, etc.) serving the collective production units and peasant households which grow grain will from now on be paid in kind according to norms set by the state, and will be paid in money only in places in which production is usually insufficient for self-sufficiency. The collective mechanized service organizations in which the peasants' labor is paid for in rice may keep only enough to meet their families' needs. The remaining rice must be sold to the state at requisition-purchasing guidance prices (if POL and spare parts are provided), or at negotiated prices (if POL and spare parts are provided), or at negotiated prices (if they are not provided).

In addition to the grain mobilized in accordance with stabilized norms, the grain sector must cooperate with the relevant sectors (the production, materials supply, domestic trade, and foreign trade sectors) in setting aside a fund of materials (means of production and construction materials) and essential industrial consumer goods, according to the actual needs, production, and living conditions of the peasants in each area, for the purchase of grain beyond the obligatory amounts, by means of appropriate methods.

The grain-growing state farms must strictly implement the grain-delivery system, in correct accordance with the annual and seasonal plan norms.

Correctly Implement Policies

With regard to people who deliberately resist and delay, and are unwilling to fulfill their obligations to the state, or who even hoard grain with the objective of speculating and profit-making, but do not change even after being educated many times, depending on the specific circumstances they must be dealt with by applying the following administrative measures.

-- As regards peasant households with much surplus rice who are unwilling to sell it to the state and deliberately hoard rice with the intention of speculating, or households which have much rice but speculate and lend at interest, their rice must be requisition-purchased at requisition-purchasing guidance prices in the locality. They should keep only enough for family consumption. The district People's Committee reviews and decides each instance.

-- Speculators and hoarders who seriously monopolize the market must be prosecuted according to law and punished for the crimes of speculation, blackmarketing and illegal commerce. Part or all of their surplus rice may be confiscated.

-- Cadres and party members must be educated so that they have a spirit of being exemplary in carrying out the state's grain policy.

With regard to market management it is necessary to practice management at the roots, in the villages and hamlets, and at the main grain delivery points. Merchants must not be allowed to buy and sell rice, corn, and wheat flour. People who peddle rice products and are authorized to engage in commerce must pay taxes and be strictly controlled with regard to the volume of goods they deal in and the area in which they do business.

Distribution and Consumption Must Be Economical

In the national grain situation being very urgent and still beset with long-range problems, society's grain consumption must be very economical, even in places with surplus rice.

The management and distribution of grain in the sector for which the state is responsible must be centralized and unified in the Ministry of Food.

-- The localities must correctly implement the central-level grain mobilization and distribution policies and plans, and retain only enough rice for consumption in the spheres in which they can distribute rice according to plan. They must strictly observe the Ministry of Food's orders to transfer rice, paddy, and the other subsidiary food crops and grains.

-- The localities, sectors, and basic-level units in the grain-short areas cannot arbitrarily establish contacts with provinces with surplus grain in order to buy and sell grain or exchange materials and goods for grain, but must follow the guidance and unified management of the Ministry of Food.

-- The exporting and importing of grain is the direct responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Ministry of Food. Every year, in addition to exporting some rice according to plan in order to keep international commitments to some fraternal countries, the Council of Ministers has assigned those two ministries the

responsibility of making specific calculations in order to carry out a plan to export and import grain in order to exchange seed as advantageously as possible, in accordance with the principle of importing first and exporting later, in order to ensure the fulfillment of international commitments.

-- The distribution of grain to categories for which the state is responsible must be tightly managed, on the basis of reviewing those categories and the standards, eliminating supply-as-needed management, and opposing all false declarations of numbers of people and standards.

It is necessary to positively requisition-purchase and process many subsidiary food crops, and ship them to the various places of consumption so that they can be distributed and eaten with rice, in order to encourage the organs, enterprises, units, and families of workers and civil servants to provide part of their own grain. The state will pay them money for the grain they do not accept.

Transportation and Storage: Urgent Problems

An urgent, long-range problem that must be resolved is organizing the shipping of rice and paddy from the south (principally the provinces of the Mekong Delta) to the north and from the port of Hai Phong to the key consumption areas. The transporting of grain in the sphere of each province and region, and throughout the nation, in accordance with transfer and distribution plans for each quarter and month (especially during the busiest requisition-purchasing months) must be well organized.

It is necessary to pay all-out attention to strengthening the work of storing and protecting state grain in all phases.

6016

CSO: 4209/408

AGRICULTURE

DONG THAP PROVINCE ATTAINS 91 PERCENT OF GRAIN MOBILIZATION NORM

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 9 Aug 82 p 1

[VNA News Release: "Dong Thap Attains 91 Percent of Annual Grain Mobilization Plan Norm"]

[Text] By the end of July, Dong Thap Province had mobilized 137,000 tons of paddy, 91 percent of its annual plan norm and an increase of 21,000 tons over the same period last year. During the 10th month and winter-spring seasons Dong Thap mobilized 132,000 tons, 101 percent of the plan norm.

The districts of Tam Nong and Thap Muoi, and 35 villages and towns in the province overfulfilled their 1982 grain obligation norms.

This year, the 10th month rice output declined and Dong Thap was able to mobilize only 33,000 tons of obligatory rice. The province expanded its winter-spring rice area to nearly 60,000 hectares and attained the highest yields ever. The grain, banking, materials, and other sectors prepared packaging, money, and production means in advance and sent cadres and personnel to the villages and hamlets to encourage the peasants to fulfill their obligations toward the state. Therefore, during the winter-spring season the province mobilized nearly 100,000 tons, an increase of 31,000 tons over the same period last year.

5616

CSO: 4209/467

AGRICULTURE

AN GIANG HARVESTS EARLY SUMMER-FALL RICE

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 9 Aug 82 p 1

[VNA News Release: "An Giang Harvests Early Summer-Fall Rice, Attains Yield of 35 Quintals Per Hectare, 5 Quintals Greater Than Last Year"]

[Text] An Giang Province has planted 75,000 hectares of summer-fall rice and has harvested 15,300 hectares of early rice, attaining an average yield of 35 quintals per hectare. Many cooperatives and production collectives in the districts of Phu Tan and Cho Moi have harvested half of their acreage and attained a yield of 40 quintals per hectare.

The production bases, protecting the remaining rice area during a month of heavy rain and flooding, have concentrated workers and materials to complete the conduit and dam installations, heighten the dikes at the heads of canals and ditches and the dikes surrounding districts and villages, planting trees to break waves, etc., in order to protect the summer-fall rice when the water was at its highest point. The villages in the districts of Phu Tan, Cho Moi, Chau Phu, and Phu Chau also built a system of dikes to protect small areas of from 1,500 to 3,000 hectares if there were breaks in the major perimeter dikes, and formed teams and groups to continually inspect dikes and dams, especially in the key areas.

5616
CSO: 4209/467

AGRICULTURE

QUICK TRANSPLANT OF 10TH-MONTH RICE URGED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 2 Aug 82 p 2

[Text] The objective conditions under which the northern provinces and cities are starting the 10th-month production season of this year are somewhat difficult.

The belated harvest of the 5th-month and spring rice crop and a protracted drought have affected the soil tilling preparatory to the transplanting of the early 10th-month rice crop and to the transplanting of rice plants to low-lying fields. There is a shortage of draft power in certain areas because many buffaloes and cattle collapsed during the recent winter-spring season. For these reasons, the task of sowing and transplanting during the 10th-month season of this year has been carried out at a slower tempo than in the previous years. To date, North Vietnam as a whole has performed the 10th-month rice sowing and transplanting task on about 60 percent of the planned area (as compared with 86 percent in the same period last year). The provinces in former Region 4 have carried out this task more rapidly than in the same period last year. The recent rains have made it possible to heighten the average daily transplanting tempo over the same period last year. In some localities, the early 10th-month rice seedlings have grown too old in a number of areas and have, therefore, been destroyed and discarded. Seedlings in 50 percent of the area where they were grown are ready to be transplanted but have to wait for available fields because harrowing has not yet been completed in large areas. In many areas destined for the early 10th-month rice crop cultivation and in many low-lying fields, transplanting has been late and has thus failed to meet the requirements of the cultivation schedule. At present, the early 10th-month rice sowing and transplanting season has drawn to a close but the area is smaller than the planned one. This situation will influence the plan for the sowing and growing of the early winter crops. In some regions, the intended use of different terrains for different rice strains has been upset (by the fact that rice seedlings destined to be transplanted to high-level fields have had to be transplanted to low-lying ones because there was not enough time to till the high-level soil), which will affect the delimitation of the winter crop area.

Harmful insects such as brown planthoppers, leaf rollers and army weevils have made an early appearance in the fields and are moving from seedlings to rice plants but the amount of insecticide and the number of spray guns available suffice only to meet half of the production season requirements. Since this year's weather conditions are marked by frequent rains and storms, the use of yard-, [field] edge- and [pond] bank-grown seedlings for rice transplanting may represent a higher ratio than in the previous years; this is because short-stem seedlings may easily be damaged by flooding and waterlogging.

To overcome the above-mentioned difficulties, cooperatives need to carry out some urgent tasks satisfactorily. Efforts must be concentrated on completing the tilling and harrowing of the remaining area, accelerating the 10th-month transplant tempo and basically completing the sowing and transplanting task at the beginning of fall in order to strictly observe the cultivation schedule and to achieve a high productivity and yield. All means must be employed extensively to bring water into fields to facilitate tilling and harrowing such as by opening sluices to obtain alluvial water, by employing buckets and water-wheels in conjunction with electric and oil pumps and by expanding the mechanically tilled and harrowed area while using the draft power of buffaloes and cattle to till the soil and using manpower to hoe fields. Early 10th-month seedlings must be transplanted into fields which are near a watercourse and are thus watered at an early time while high-level fields which are watered belatedly must wait for the transplant of the main 10th-month crop seedlings. After conducting an intensive inspection to classify seedlings according to their qualities, cooperatives must make further calculations to apportion the seedling and transplanting areas according to plan so as to be able to take timely measures to obtain a sufficient amount of good seedlings to carry out transplanting on the entire planned area. Areas where seeds have been sown must be taken care of and fertilized; if an insufficient amount of seeds have been sown, additional ones must be sown to obtain a sufficient reserve of good quality seedlings destined for the late rice transplant or replacement transplant. Especially for low-lying fields wherefrom water will recede slowly, long-term high-stem varieties such as "Moc Tuyen," "Bao Thai Lun" and "Nep Con" [Small Glutinous Rice] must be used for replacement transplant when their seedlings are 45 to 65 days' old. Seeds must be sown from now to 5 August in order to complete the transplant by 5 September at the latest.

For high-level fields or fields which are adjacent to a water course and subject to flooding and waterlogging but wherefrom water will recede quickly, it is possible to sow seeds of nonphotosensitive short-term rice varieties such as "Nong Nghiep 75-6," "Nong Nghiep 75-10" and "IR 1561-12." Seed sowing must be carried out from now to 5 August to make it possible to complete transplanting by 5 September at the latest (when seedlings are 30-day old). Seeds may be sown on yards by 10 August at the latest to make it possible to complete transplanting by 20 August at the latest (when seedlings have two and a half or three leaves). Where conditions permit direct sowing, it must be completed by 10 August at the latest. With regard to ricefields where transplanting is performed belatedly or a replacement

transplant is carried out, it is necessary to implement some principal technical measures such as intensively applying the main fertilizer by using 10 to 12 tons of manure per hectare to enable rice plants to tiller rapidly and neatly. In addition, it is necessary to apply nitrate fertilizer. Transplanting must be dense in order to obtain large ears. If high-stem varieties are transplanted, density must be from 40 to 45 clusters per square meter, each to be composed of 5 to 7 individual rice plants. Care must be taken to control drought to prevent boots from being smothered when rice plants begin to blossom. It is necessary to prevent and exterminate harmful insects such as stem borers, army worms, leaf rollers and rice bugs especially near the end of the crop cultivation season. Attention must be paid to treating retransplanted rice plants in such a way as to enable them to blossom during the dew falling period (23 October).

During the 10th-month season, harmful insect control plays a very important role with a highly decisive effect upon productivity. It is necessary to strengthen immediately the vegetation protection forces at the grassroots level and to inspect ricefields intensively to detect and exterminate [harmful insects] quickly by taking combined measures. Following several weeding stages, an additional application of chemical fertilizer must be performed quickly for rice plants.

In addition to preventing and controlling drought, cooperatives must adequately protect the transplanted rice areas by making urgent preparations to readily fight waterlogging such as by consolidating the banks of each area and plot and repairing electric and oil pump stations.

All localities in North Vietnam must try to carry out the above-mentioned measures satisfactorily and to fulfill and even overfulfill the planned norm for the 10th-month rice transplanting area.

The southern provinces must take advantage of favorable weather conditions to mobilize forces to accelerate tilling and to fulfill and ever surpass the planned norm for the 10th-month rice sowing and transplanting area in order to make up for the area deficit sustained in the [last] winter-spring and summer-fall seasons.

9332

CSO: 4209/448

AGRICULTURE

NAM BO PROVINCES STEP UP 10TH-MONTH RICE PLANTING RATE

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Aug 82 p 1

[Article: "Nam Bo Provinces Plant 10th-Month Rice at Rate Four Times Faster Than 10 Days Ago"]

[Text] Between 25 July and 5 August the provinces south of Thuan Hai planted 139,000 hectares of 10th month rice, a rate four times faster than the previous 10 days (an increase of more than 8,000 hectares). The seven provinces of the Mekong Delta (excepting An Giang and Dong Thap, which essentially completed their 10th month planting) planted an average of 10,000 hectares a day. That rate was the fastest to date.

Thus as of 5 August the provinces in the former Nam Bo had planted 714,000 hectares of 10th month rice, 40 percent of the area plan. The Mekong Delta provinces attained 42.5 percent. Although at the beginning of the season Ben Tre and Tien Giang provinces planted slowly, thanks to good preparation of the cultivation tasks the 10th month planting rate is now four times greater than during the same period last year. Cuu Long Province sowed nearly 15,000 hectares of rice seedlings and more than 6,000 hectares of grafted rice, not counting the directly sown rice. Those seedlings and grafted rice were sufficient to transplant 140,000 hectares. The sowing of the rice seedlings to be transplanted in paddies after the summer-fall rice has been harvested is being completed. The provinces of eastern Nam Bo and the former Zone 6 have attained only 27.5 percent of their planting plans. Minh Hai has a large 10th month area (269,000 hectares), but has attained only 11 percent of its planting plan norm, six times slower than last year.

Along with putting out the 10th month crop, during the first 10 days of August the provinces in the former Nam Bo harvested 52,000 hectares of summer-fall rice, 18 percent of the planting. Many places are now in the busiest part of the harvesting season. The provinces of An Giang, Tien Giang, and Song Be have harvested 30 to 50 percent of their areas. According to an evaluation of the first phase in a number of localities, summer-fall rice yields were not only higher than last year but were also two to four quintals higher than the plan norm.

56161

CSO: 4209/467

AGRICULTURE

PLANTING OF TENTH-MONTH RICE SLOWER THAN LAST YEAR

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 31 Jul 82 p 1

[Article: "Nationwide Sowing and Transplanting Completed in 44.5 Percent of Planned Area, at A Pace Slower Than Last Year's"]

[Text] As of 25 July, the country as a whole has sown and transplanted the tenth-month rice in 1.498 million hectares, or 44.5 percent of the planned area, at a slower pace than in the same period last year.

According to the Statistics General Department, the northern provinces have finished transplanting rice seedlings in only 60 percent of their goal, a low figure as compared with crop schedule needs. The former Zone 4 provinces were doing the job more quickly, having achieved 80.3 percent of the planned goal. Thanh Hoa Province overcame difficulties in connection with sources of water and draft power and has finished transplanting in 62.3 percent of the planned goal. The Red River delta provinces have finished transplanting in 42.6 percent, with the faster ones being Hai Hung, Thai Binh and Ha Nam Ninh. In Ha Nam Ninh, 151 of its 646 co-operatives have completely finished transplanting. The midland provinces have finished transplanting in 51.4 percent. Vinh Phu Province was slow in the transplanting job. At present, 42,000 hectares of transplanted seedlings lack water, mostly in these provinces: Nghe Tinh, Thai Binh, Thanh Hoa, Hai Hung and Ha Bac. In 15 provinces 25,000 hectares of rice plants were infested by harmful insects, mostly by stem borers, leaf rollers and brown leafhoppers.

All localities carried to the fields a total of 3.664 million tons of organic fertilizer to apply as the main fertilizer prior to transplanting of the tenth-month rice seedlings. In average 4.6 tons were used per hectare, or 1 quintal per hectare more than the amount used in the same period last year. In addition, 44,000 tons of chemical fertilizers were sent to the cooperatives.

The southern provinces, in addition to sowing and transplanting the tenth-month rice at an accelerated pace, have finished harvesting 36,000 hectares of summer and autumn rice crop, or 57 percent of the cultivated area. They are now inspecting the fields to evaluate crop yields. In the North, the autumn rice plants are

growing nicely. If there are no heavy rains between now and harvest time, Nghe Tinh and Binh Tri Thien Provinces will have a good autumn rice crop.

As to the summer and autumn vegetables, subsidiary food crops and industrial plants, the country as a whole has grown them in 416,000 hectares, a larger area as compared with the same period last year. The northern provinces have grown sweet potato and produced sweet potato cuttings in a total area of 19,000 hectares, an increase of 1,000 hectares as compared with the same period last year.

5598

CSO: 4209/446

AGRICULTURE

EDITORIAL SUGGESTS WAYS TO INCREASE AZOLLA PRODUCTION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 31 Jul 82 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: " Extending Azolla Production"]

[Text] Azolla is a precious green-manure plant. Rice crop yield depends to an important degree on the quantity of azolla used to fertilize a ricefield.

How widespread the movement to grow azolla can be extended depends first on the volume and quantities of azolla seeds. The latter are kept through the summer in state stations and farms and the cooperative installations specialized in growing azolla. The seeds begin to reproduce widely from August on.

Although the usefulness of azolla has been confirmed by production reality and the results of scientific analyses, why did the movement to grow azolla tend to slow down, even to decline in some localities, in the last few years? In the northern provinces, in 1964 the area used to grow azolla was larger than the fifth-month and spring rice-growing area of 320,000 hectares, but it has gone down to 190,000 hectares. We must find the most principal reasons so as to have proper guidelines and measure to overcome this situation and to move the movement forward again.

In the past, since the azolla-growing cooperatives under piece-work contracts normally let their azolla-growing units work freely to gain work points, the costs of azolla were too high and did not encourage cooperative members to extend the area used to grow it. Recently a number of cooperatives have begun to apply the system of product contracts with laborers to azolla growing, but because there are no appropriate work point system and no policy that truly encourages producers yet, they have not yet brought about any vigorous change. Besides, farmers have figured it out that buying chemical fertilizers to fertilize their ricefields would be cheaper and more convenient than expending a lot of labor to grow azolla. As the azolla season coincides with harvest of the tenth-month rice and growing the winter-spring crop, caring for and protecting azolla usually is far from careful, with a lot of damage caused by harmful insects and drought. However, the real

principal reason behind the decline of the movement to grow azolla is the fact that the responsible organ and sector have not yet put leadership and management into perspective and have lacked the determination to overcome difficulties and to look for effective measures to take.

In the years lying ahead, with limited quantities of imported fertilizers, the task of agriculture requires production of an ever increasing volume of grain. The direction for us to take is to exploit to the highest degree and to use in the best way all domestic sources of fertilizers. Beside stable manure of all kinds, azolla is considered a source of green manure of greatest economic results.

As the farming and agricultural management systems in our country are being changed to have in-depth progress, the method of producing azolla also needs to be changed to bring about the best results. The introduction of technology to agricultural production must be closely linked with the managerial measure that reflects the tight bond between producing power and production relationships. Improving the management system creates favorable conditions for the azolla-growing technique to encroach upon production and to make its effects felt. We must widely apply and gradually heighten end-product contracting with the azolla-producing labor groups and laborers. Production reality has shown that the movement not only cannot develop but also declines steadily wherever product contracts are not adopted for azolla production. Contracting must include all stages, from seed production to the last job of growing azolla in ricefields, while stressing the need to have large quantities of good azolla seeds and lots of ricefields showing good results. Appropriate numbers of work points are to be awarded to producers for reaching two goals: to raise rice crop yield and to improve and enrich the soil. The production of azolla seeds must be assigned to the azolla-growing units of the cooperatives in order to ensure both quantities and quality of azolla; caring for azolla in main-crop ricefields is to be assigned to cooperative members. We must build many azolla-reproducing stations and azolla seed-producing ricefields. Early preparations for accommodating azolla can be made in the ricefields where the early tenth-month rice crop has just been harvested. Every cooperative should put aside a few hectares for reproduction of azolla in September, October and November. After the tenth-month rice has been harvested in the low ricefields, we must continue to bring azolla there for reproduction in November, December and January of the following year. As to "intensive cultivation" azolla, a few hectares of the tenth-month rice seedling-producing ricefields can be put aside for reproduction of azolla from August on, with azolla being picked and used to fertilize the winter season crops. Since azolla damages can result from harmful insects and diseases and lack of fertilizer, mostly phosphate fertilizer, the care for azolla must be continuous and technically proper, even in the busy days of the crop season. Building the material and technical base and work force for azolla growing is very necessary to maintain and steadily develop the movement.

Provinces and districts need to have state azolla farms; a cluster of cooperatives or a small area having an azolla seed-producing station must receive assistance from the state organ. Cooperatives must have their own azolla-growing units or groups in order to produce enough azolla seeds to assign to cooperative members, who will further reproduce them in the ricefields assigned to them.

To expand production of azolla is an important measure which is both fast and inexpensive and effectively aimed at satisfying the needs for intensive cultivation, multicropping and soil improvement in many years to come.

5598

CSO: 4209/446

AGRICULTURE

LAND MANAGEMENT IN LONG AN PROVINCE DISCUSSED

Hanoi NONG NGHIEP in Vietnamese 20 Jun 82 p 7

[Article by Phuong Nam: "On Land Management in Long An"]

[Text] Land is an extremely valuable natural resource of the homeland. It is a result of a historic process of struggle and labor by our people over a period of thousands of years. Land is a special, irreplaceable means of production of agricultural and forestry production, and is the foundation for the distribution and construction of the national economic sector, the population zones, and installations serving the people's lives, cultural development, and the building up of national defense.

Articles 19 and 20 of our country's constitution stipulate that "Land, forests, and mountains ... are owned by all the people," "The state unifies the management of land in accordance with a common plan, in order to ensure that land is used rationally and economically," and "Land set aside for agriculture and forestry cannot be used for other purposes without permission from a competent state organ."

A Serious Situation

However, a matter worthy of criticism is that in some localities in the former Nam Bo region the taking over of land for private use is rather widespread. We went to Long An, a province in the Mekong Delta. There the provincial Land Management Board informed us that:

During the recent period in Long An, due to the requirements of capital construction and population growth, and especially to people "getting a jump on" the land policy, especially in the high-yield rice areas, a considerable amount of land has been lost because of the arbitrary, illegal digging of ponds, expanding of homesteads, digging of ditches, expanding of fences, and creation of fields.

In five villages in Can Giuoc District there were 473 instances involving the loss of 24.3 hectares of one-crop and two-crop rice land. In 14 villages in Can Duoc District there were 699 instances involving the loss of 17.2 hectares of one-crop rice land and 23.3 hectares of two-crop rice land. Especially, in 12 villages along Route 4 in Ben Thu District there were 1,781 violations involving the loss of 217.8 hectares of high-yield rice paddies. The villages of Huong Tho Phu and Binh Duc were the places where the most land violations occurred. Between 1977 and

1981 there were more than 600 violations in Huong Tho Thu, and there were more than 500 violations in Binh Duc. There were also at least 100 violations in the villages of Thanh Thu, Nhi Thanh, and Binh Phong Thanh.

The people who encroach upon land include ordinary people, cadres, party members, and demobilized military personnel, and even a small number of provincial-level leadership cadres. They use the stratagem of gradual encroachment, of "getting a foot in the door." The Chairman of the Ben Thu District People's Committee informed us that in order to take over a piece of land, at first they plant a few banana plants or a row of border-marking plants, for example, in order to test the reaction. When they see that the local authorities do not protest they take another step forward by erecting a small hut. If nothing happens, they gradually expand their base by planting additional plants and digging wells, then reach the final stage by building a house with several rooms, complete with orchards and fish ponds. If the local administration steps in they say that it would be difficult to undo what has been done. If the administration adopts a resolute attitude they ask for a postponement or resist by delaying. Faced with a fait accompli, the administration is hesitant and looks the other way, so the homestead and land are regarded as belonging to them. On the average, such a homestead takes over from one to three cong [1 cong = 1,000 square meters] some cases four or five cong. The district as a whole loses hundreds of hectares of cultivated land!

The Reasons

What causes them to illegally occupy land? We had the occasion to drop in on the family of Mr. Huynh Dong D on Route 4, on the way to Ben Thu District. His homestead included two houses, an orchard, and two fish ponds, and covered an area of three cong of land. He confided to us, "Listen! Sooner or later we will enter a collective or cooperative, at which time the land will be owned jointly. So we 'get the jump on' a piece of land in advance so that we will have land on which to build houses for our children!"

Mr. D, like many other people, knows that land will be jointly owned once it is cooperativized and acted before the policy was adopted. Many other people we met also made very strage excuses for their actions. Some needed land for their burial after they die, while others needed land to support themselves in their old age, when there was no one to take care of them or if their children refused to do so!

That's what they said, but in fact they had objectives that were extremely economic. For example, Mr. D., of whom we have spoken, had sold one homestead and was now living on his second homestead. That is a manner of dealing in land that is entirely contrary to current law.

Who is responsible for that situation? First of all, it results from the local administration not having a resolute attitude from the beginning, and fearing difficulty and backing off after the violation occurs. Second, many cadres and party members are not exemplary in carrying out the state's land management policy. They go to the localities and request or purchase land being used for production, with the intention of increasing output to improve their living standards, establishing a family, retiring, etc. The local administration must often indulge them and can't speak out.

Measures of Prevention

-- In order to promptly stop the illegal encroachment of land, practical steps must be taken. That was the opinion of the head of the Land Management Board of Long An Province.

He continued, "In doing so, the Provincial People's Committee admonished the departments, sectors, and districts to intensify their education that the cadres and the masses can fully understand the land management policy, based on Decision 210, dated 1 May 1980, of the Council of Ministers. In addition, it is necessary to emphasize administrative and economic measures. In implementing that policy cadres and party members must set an example for the masses to follow. All villages must promptly zone residential areas in which, if necessary, the people may build additional houses."

We asked, "But at present there are many 'fait accompli' cases. How should they be handled?"

The board chairman pulled from a file Directive No 20 of the Provincial People's Committee and showed it to us, then said, "There are three types of land violations: Type 1, people who have correctly requested permission to subdivide their household but have committed the error of building a house on state land; Type 2, people who 'get a jump on' the policy, i.e. do not make a request to subdivide their household but still settle on land set aside for old people or for youths and teenagers; and Type 3, people who illegally buy, sell, lease, or trade land for goods or money. There are even instances of land being transformed from rice land to a homestead and then sold for a large profit.

Such cases are dealt with as follows:

With regard to Type 1, the localities help make arrangements within the families and people to move the houses to residential areas and return the land to production. With regard to Type 2, the violators are forced to return the land to the state. With regard to Type 3, a recommendation is made that the Provincial People's Committee order the confiscation of land that was illegally bought, sold, or leased. The violators are educated and encouraged to accept responsibility for their acts. If not, they will be dealt with in accordance with Decision 210/CP and state laws.

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200: 4200/6-8

AGRICULTURE

PRIORITY GIVEN AREAS TO PROVIDE IRRIGATION WATER

Nine Northern Provinces

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 1 Aug 82 p 1

[Article: "Continued Priority Given Electricity Sources To Fight 10th-Month Crop Drought"]

[Text] Since mid-June, the electricity sector has supplied as a priority more than 42,000 kw/h of electricity per day to electric pumping stations in 9 northern provinces and cities located within the electricity network, contributing to providing irrigation water to nearly 500,000 hectares of 10th-month cropland.

As of 29 July, however, because of lingering summer heat and uneven rainfalls, about 100,000 hectares (including 40,000 hectares of transplanted field) still were affected by drought, thus slowing up the sowing-transplanting pace and impacting on the conditions of growth of newly transplanted 10th-month rice. Thanh Hoa Province has 10,000 hectares of 10th-month rice hit by drought. Over 21,000 hectares (chiefly those with 10th-month rice seedlings already in place) in Hai Hung and Ha Nam Ninh were hard hit. In recent days, electricity supply to electric pumping stations has not yet been stable, meeting just from 40 to 50 percent of the total need.

Electric pumping stations with large capacity in the northern delta provinces experienced many outages in a single day. Worse still, some had no electric current all day long. Nearly all small-size pumping stations have received no electricity at all, substantially contributing to reducing the capability of fighting the 10th-month crop drought. Moving swiftly to remedy the above situation, the electricity, water conservancy and agricultural sectors have drawn up plans for maintaining and stabilizing the supply of electricity to pumping stations, so as promptly to obtain water for transplanting rice and fighting drought affecting it.

The provinces and cities located within the electricity network have strived to reduce to the strict minimum electricity consumption for daily needs, and circumstances of irrational use of electricity. The Ministry of Water Conservancy has reminded localities that, while concentrating on rationally exploiting water sources at electric pump stations and irrigation works, they must mobilize peasants to use all available buckets and waterwheels to fight drought, and prevent waterlogging caused by unusual weather conditions.

Thanh Hoa Province

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 1 Aug 82 pp 1, 4

[Article: "Thanh Hoa Fights Drought, Swiftly Transplants 10th-Month Rice"]

[Text] Due to lingering summer heat, more than 18,500 hectares of 10th-month rice in Thanh Hoa Province were affected by drought. Over 30,000 hectares of ricefield (chiefly those located at the end of canals and in areas where kerosene pumps are used) lack water for transplanting. The districts of Hoang Hoa, Hau Loc, Tho Xuan and Vinh Thanh each have from 1,000 to 5,000 hectares of fields affected by drought. Especially in Thieu Yen District, a rice granary of the province, 40 percent of the rice area still lack water for transplanting although the sowing and transplanting schedule is coming to an end.

The Thanh Hoa electricity service has concentrated in priority 3,000 kw/h of electricity on the districts for fighting drought. The water conservancy sector and the Southern Ma River Irrigation Corporation has supplied kerosene to the Thieu Ten electric pumping station, and actively supplied water to the district for sowing and transplanting the entire area. The irrigation corporations of the Southern Ma River and the Chu River, as well as the agricultural cooperatives in the drought affected areas are exploiting water sources and mobilizing all available buckets and waterwheels to the fields for fighting drought.

As of 27 July, the entire province has sowed and transplanted 110,000 hectares of 10th-month rice, fulfilling over 77 percent of plan in terms of area, including over 90 percent of area transplanted within the schedule. Thanh Hoa has transplanted 23,000 hectares of early 10th-month rice on winter cropland, a 43.7 percent increase over the early 10th-month rice area of the previous season.

The provincial agricultural and supply sectors have sent to the districts over 20,000 tons of nitrate and phosphate fertilizer, nearly 800 spraying tanks and 150 tons of insecticide. The cooperatives have weeded, puddled and applied additional fertilizer to over 20,000 hectares of 10th month rice. Nearly all rice areas were previously treated with an average of over 10 tons of organic fertilizer, over 200 kilograms of nitrate fertilizer per hectare, and since water was supplied in sufficient quantity the rice has grown fast. Everyday, the province earmarks 140,000 kw/h of electricity for kerosene pumping stations and supplies to them an additional 150 tons of kerosene, enabling them to keep water in sufficient quantity in the ricefields. Over 60 percent of cooperatives have strengthened plant protection and irrigation management teams promptly exterminating leaf rollers and brown leafhoppers.

9213

CSO: 4209/447

AGRICULTURE

MORE ATTENTION NEEDED TO MANAGEMENT, DISTRIBUTION OF COAL

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 27 Jul 82 p 2

[Article by Phung Van Thi, acting director of Coal Supply General Corporation: "Impact of Coal Sector on Basic Components of Agriculture"]

[Text] In agriculture, water conservancy is seen as a forecast measure. Electricity plays an increasingly important role in carrying out that measure--scientifically irrigating and removing water, getting ready to fight waterlogging as the rainy season draws near, and fighting the ongoing drought. At present, electricity is being supplied mainly by thermoelectric power stations. That is why in times of drought and waterlogging, the coal sector treats these power plants as key customers, for whom it takes care to organize properly the loading, unloading, transportation and concentrated delivery of coal. Frequently, nearly one-half of the volume of coal intended for all economic sectors nationwide must be sent to power plants.

This clearly shows that the coal sector has the responsibility to concentrate on the basic components of agriculture and to join forces with other branches, so as continually to increase agricultural production efficiency.

To that aim, we must also supply coal more promptly to mechanical enterprises which produce agricultural implements and technical equipment, and to fertilizer enterprises such as those which produce phosphate and nitrate fertilizers, or grind apatite and phosphate, etc. Although it is more difficult to extract and select lump coal than loose coal, the former is a high-value export commodity; however, because of agricultural priority, we have plans to earmark lump coal for fertilizer factories.

In low-lying areas where 5th-month crops are grown, and in coastal areas requiring desalination, we also reserve from 250,000 to 300,000 tons of coal each year to burn lime for use as fertilizer. Not only do we pay attention to supplying enough coal to produce adequate quantities of fertilizers and agricultural implements, but we must also make sure that these means of production are turned out and shipped to the rural areas well within a timely schedule. Exploitation of local coal mines must be stepped up to respond to agricultural requirements. In addition to being used as fuel in lieu of hay and in burning lime, baking bricks and tiles, etc., peat is also used to process fertilizers (about 50,000 tons per year). In the Hanoi suburban areas, and in Yen Phon (Ha Bac), Hoan Dan (Vinh Phu), Phong Chuong (Binh Tri Thien),

etc., peat-related fertilizer contributes to raising the crop yield. Furthermore, the Chemicals General Department has conducted a successful research into using peat to produce nutritious feed to increase the weight of domestic animals, thus contributing to developing animal husbandry.

The coal sector has supplied very little to enterprises which process manioc, tea, tobacco, sugar, sugarcane, silk; but since these installations are scattered in many places, attention must be paid to observing the best farming schedule, to accumulating necessary reserves, and to ensuring the quality of agricultural produces, especially those having a high export value.

Moreover, each year the coal sector supplies the rural areas with some 600,000 tons of coal for burning lime, and baking bricks and tiles needed for building stations, farms, storehouses, drying yards, animal husbandry installations, and water conservancy works, as well as some houses for peasants. The volume of coal needed for agricultural development has increased with every passing day, thus causing the coal sector quite a few difficulties, especially shortages of equipment and means, but we have strived to fulfill the 1982 state plan. To meet that big requirement, in the coming months we will continually send many groups of cadres into key districts, such as Dong Hung (Thai Binh), Nam Ninh (Ha Nam Ninh), Vinh Lac (Vinh Phu), Tho Xuan (Thanh Hoa), and Quynh Luu (Nghe Tinh), and also into southern districts, such as Cu Chi, Long Thanh, An Son, Cai Lay, Long My, etc., to study the situation and better organize coal supply. In northern districts with access to waterways and railways, we must reposition coal storehouses to make transportation of coal to production installations more convenient. The coal sector will also set up corporations to act as agents for bringing coal straight into the districts, with focus, however, on strengthened control over how to use coal in line with goals and requirements. In the last months of this year, the localities and sectors having means of transportation may receive extra coal, on top of the norms stipulated at the beginning of the year. An additional allocation of over 100,000 tons of coal will be supplied to the electric sector for emergency use, and for serving agriculture more properly.

The coal sector will also urge various echelons and sectors to devote more attention to management and distribution of coal in support for agriculture, and to take concrete measures to store coal securely, and to prevent and stop illegal dealings in coal, so as to ensure that the volume of coal intended for agriculture will be used rationally and with high efficiency, thus giving rise to ever increasing deliveries of agricultural products to the state.

0213

CSO: 4209/443

HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

BRIEFS

MORE INSTALLATIONS COMPLETED--Hanoi, 28 Aug (VNA)--Eleven more installations have just been completed at the building site of the Pha Lai Thermal Power Plant in Hai Hung Province. Those include the chimney of the steam power station, the underground section of the pumping station, the steam power station and two oil tanks. The first phase of the construction of the Hanoi cotton-spinning mill has been completed. Construction is being stepped up at the remaining works so that the mill may be commissioned at the end of this year. The water supply company No 2 under the ministry of building has completed several water supply projects in Tra Vinh, provincial capital of Cuu Long Province, broadened the Ba Rai-vung Tau Water Plant, the refrigerating room of the Nha Trang Cotton-Spinning Mill, the water pipes from Dieu Tri to Quy Nhon and water supply projects for the frozen seafoods factory, and tourist centres in Rach Gia, Yung Tau and Tay Ninh. [Text] [Hanoi VNA in English 1526 GMT 28 Aug 82 OW]

CSO: 4220/335

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE CEREMONY INAUGURATES VUNG TAU PORT

Vung Tau VUNG TAU-CON DAO in Vietnamese 17 Jun 82 p 1

[Article by Nguyen Hung: "Vung Tau Port Inaugurated"]

[Text] On 10 June, the Special Zone People's Committee held a solemn ceremony to inaugurate Vung Tau Port.

Present at the ceremony were Le Quang Thanh, secretary of the Special Zone Party Committee; Lam Van The, member of the party Central Committee and chairman of the Special Zone People's Committee and Nguyen Hong Can, vice minister of Marine Products together with many comrades from the party organization Executive Committee and the Special Zone People's Committee as well as representatives of various organs, departments, sectors and mass organizations which belonged to the special zone or the central level and which were stationed in the locality.

The construction of Vung Tau Port was completed after more than 7 months of work execution. The project was built at a very urgent tempo and with the participation of units located inside and outside the special zone such as Building Corporation 4-6, the Water Supply and Drainage Corporation, the Sea Shipping Refloating and Salvage Corporation, the Electric Power Service, the Building Unit of the Con Dao State-Operated Fishing Enterprise and so forth. Vung Tau Port will contribute effectively to meeting the logistic needs of the marine products sector in the special zone and will simultaneously help promote oil and natural gas exploration and exploitation.

Expressing his views at the ceremony, Lam Van The warmly praised the enthusiasm of the units participating in construction and of the organs, departments, sectors and mass organizations whose active contributions had led to an early completion of the project. He entrusted the Marine Products Service with the task of managing Vung Tau Port, putting it into use and fully exploiting its great potential.

9332

CSO: 4209/436

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

GRAIN LOSSES IN TRANSPORTATION, DISTRIBUTION ANALYZED

Hanoi LAO DONG in Vietnamese 1, 8 Jul 82 p 3

[Article by Dinh Hang and Thieu Mai: "Great Grain Losses in Transportation and Distribution"]

[Text] After being shipped from the farmer, each grain of rice, potato tuber and ear of corn will become a kind of strategic commodity in man's material life and will have to go through five basic stages: Collection-purchase, transportation, preservation, processing and distribution. All the cadres and employees of the grain sector whom we have had the opportunity to meet have asserted that at present preservation and processing are two tasks which are being carried out satisfactorily. The quality of grain deposited in many warehouses has been maintained very effectively due to the application of advanced methods, to the use of modern equipment and to the presence of a responsible personnel. If some spoilage and loss occurs during this stage, it is imputable only to temporary transit storehouses or to small depots in remote areas. With regard to processing, it can be said that all of the mills subordinate to the grain processing enterprises federation have adhered to technical standards and achieved the principal product retrieval rate--which reaches 71.2 and 71.53 percent respectively in the Viet Tri and Bac Giang mills. This represents a great effort of the grain sector. However, the other three stages are still affected by worrisome problems which have been and are being severely criticized by public opinion.

Unindemnified Losses

At present we are trying to achieve nationwide self-sufficiency in grain production and we are still receiving grain from abroad but not in large quantities. The grain sector has, therefore, concentrated cadres and means on collection-purchase. The 1981 grain year ended with an increase of nearly 500,000 tons over 1980 but fulfilled only 95.1 percent of the collection-purchase plan norm. In the first 6 months of 1982, collection-purchase made great progress and "grain delivery festivals" really became festive days when farmers fulfilled their obligation to the fatherland. But there still were many problems in the collection-purchase process which should be discussed such as prices, goods transfer and administrative formalities... and there was also the question, among others, of why province A overfulfilled the norm while province B failed to fulfill the plan though

both were situated in the same region. We are not going to discuss all of these problems. In this article, we will deal only with transportation and distribution--the two stages in which the state-owned grain has incurred serious spoilage, waste and losses.

A survey of figures concerning five grain transportation lines has revealed that all of them have fulfilled about 100 percent of the transportation plan and that some of them has even fulfilled it by 108.1 percent. But these figures reflect only one aspect of the problem. What these figures do not represent is the fact that a large amount of state-owned grain has been lost with impunity on the sea, river, railway and road transportation lines no matter whether mechanized or rudimentary transportation means have been used. The losses have been small on short distances and heavy on long ones and range from a few kilograms per bag, vehicle or boat to even an entire large load of grain. Worse still, sabotage has been carried out: For instance, after taking away the goods, thieves poured sand and water on the remaining grain. There is also the case of the 15 June 1982 sinking "without cause" of two boats carrying 300 tons of paddy from An Giang. People said "the boats sank because the sailors were drunk." While the judiciary is holding an inquiry, public opinion believes that this is a case of theft and that the boats were sunk to destroy the evidence.

Regulations allow for the following rates of waste and loss during transportation: 0.7 percent for rice in bags and 1.2 for paddy. In practice, these rates have never been complied with during any transportation trip no matter whatever transportation means is used; on the contrary, a large amount of goods has been missing. In 1981, the loss incurred was 9.75 percent with 48 sea ships carrying grain in bags and 22.39 percent with 9 ships carrying grain in batches. In a space of 8 months, the amount of grain received by Thanh Hoa and Nghe Tinh Provinces was 17,893 and 14,913 tons short respectively. According to figures indicated in a control report by the Ministry of Food and in other reports by various localities, there was a shortage of 26.5 percent in the amount of rice received by Ha Bac from 95 barges coming from Haiphong; among these barges, the No 53 one carried 122.4 tons but delivered 61.6 tons less, the No 72 one carried 113 tons but delivered 52 tons less and the No 61 one carried 110 tons but delivered 46.6 tons less. In March and April 1981, Hanoi incurred a shortage of 735 tons from the 5,785 tons of rice carried from South Vietnam to this city by railroad. Huge shortages were also noted on receipt of shipments; for instance, a shortage of 44.38, 40.55 and 19.52 percent was found in the cargoes delivered by the ships Song Day, Song Huong and Song Thanh respectively, etc. Comrades at the Tra Noc general warehouse of the level-I Song Hau Food Corporation told us that 0.7 percent deficit was allowed for 5- to 7-ton trucks carrying rice from the western provinces to the general warehouse but that all of these trucks delivered with a shortage of 100 kgs or more and sometimes between 400 and 500 kgs. On perusal of the documents concerning four out of hundreds of trucks which carried rice to the Van Don (Saigon) shipping and receiving station in June 1982, 23 found that each delivered with a shortage of between 245 and 368 kgs. People may ask: If such a deficit is found in each vehicle trip, how much grain will the state lose from thousands of such trips per year?

The figure will not be small. Readers may also wonder who will be held responsible for such huge losses. To our knowledge, certain cases of theft during the transportation process have been brought to court and that some thieves have been sentenced to death or ordered to pay material indemnities corresponding to the grain shortage. These are typical cases, though, while almost all deficit cases have been dealt with merely by drawing up and filing reports without determining the responsible persons, without requesting indemnification and even without taking administrative measures. Though unindemnified losses and unpunished thefts are very bizarre phenomena in the field of economic management, they have always been considered "normal" in the transportation and receipt of grain in both North and South Vietnam. Such a kind of discipline has naturally led to the loss, spoilage and waste of commodities.

According to transportation principles, in case of loss, deterioration or waste of grain, the transportation agency concerned has the duty to draw up a commercial report to serve as a basis for determining responsibilities and requesting indemnification. However, for fear of responsibility, the transportation sector has long been reluctant to take the initiative to do so. On their part, the food sector installations have also failed to firmly request the transportation agencies to do so. In some cases, reports were drawn up but their contents were so vague that responsibilities could not be determined. There were many cases when, for some reason or another, the food sector cadres did draw up reports but laid the responsibility on themselves and the commodity selling units.

In an article written for intramural use, Thanh Ha, a managerial cadre of the Ministry of Food, has revealed the causes of the above-mentioned cases such as the inaccuracy of initial measurements and assessments of quantities, a lack of close coordination among various sectors (food, transportation and communications and internal affairs) and also between these sectors and the administration at all levels, the loose application of principles and systems of transportation and receipt, the entrusting of transportation means to some depraved and disqualified elements, etc. These causes are fundamental but we still think it necessary to discuss some other problems, namely, the inappropriateness of the old regulations and systems applied by the sectors which deal with grain. For example, weight is measured by using snap scoops and observing the loading capacities of boats when sea and river transportation means are employed. Though this method is an advanced one from the scientific point of view, its application will be satisfactory only if some other conditions are fulfilled. Since this requirement has not yet been met by us, it has led to a lack of uniformity in the "production pattern." It is precisely because of this disparity that the weight indicated in a shipping document is considered only as a reference figure (!) while the weight calculated on the basis of snap scoops and loading capacities usually differs from the actual one. This is a gap which dishonest people have taken advantage of to steal grain. Another method is the 10-percent sample weighing. Should this rate be applied to all the transportation means being used in our country? It may be appropriate to apply this rate to a sea ship plying between North and South Vietnam or to a group of barges carrying thousands of tons of grain but it would be inappropriate to apply it to a 4-ton truck or an ox cart....

After reviewing the 1981 situation, the grain sector has set forth certain measures to minimize losses during the transportation process. Though positive, these measures represent only the job of a single sector. Our opinion is that, to remedy this state of affairs most satisfactorily, there must be a closer overall coordination among the sectors concerned, especially the grain, transportation-communications and internal affairs sectors. Such coordination must be exercised not only at the central level but also at the provincial, district, village and ward levels and between the administration and the mass organizations. In the second quarter of 1982, the trade union in the [grain] sector has directed the Level-1 Grain Corporation in Haiphong to pledge to emulate with the Haiphong Port stevedores and both sides have pledged to handle cargoes quickly and to protect commodities adequately. Though there is nothing new in this form of endeavor, it is nonetheless a gunshot in the battle waged by us to protect grain.

Loopholes and Irrationalities in Distribution

The instability of our yearly grain production is marked by a high yield when bumper crops are obtained and by a low yield when the harvest is bad. In the coming years, we will have to try to achieve over 17 million tons of grain per year. Even if this norm is attained, there still will be an imbalance between production and consumption. Moreover, the population will increase by about 1 million or more each year.

In view of this situation, a very important and extremely urgent problem facing us is to step up agricultural production and grain processing, on the one hand, and to wisely organize distribution on a national scale. To carry out this task [distribution] satisfactorily, it is first necessary to regulate the grain commodity between the north and the south, between different economic zones, between the mountainous regions and the deltas, between the rice growing areas and the industrial crop areas and between cities and the countryside. Over the past few years, we have carried out this apportionment fairly well but the grain moving and transportation stage has been plagued with obstructions and substantial "spillovers." Not long ago, some northern provinces were short of grain and unable to supply cadres and workers in time with their monthly standard rations while heaps of paddy and rice were left in the open in the Mekong River delta and were stagnating in warehouses, storage fields and mills in the southern provinces and also at some large harbors in Central and North Vietnam.

Concerning the distribution policy, a pluralistic system has been prevailing for a very long time among all social strata. Rice has been supplied [indiscriminately] both to persons having and not having economic relationships with the state; worse still, rice has been provided at the supply price for people whose overall activities have surely disturbed socio-economic management. Statistics compiled by 16 out of 19 northern provinces have shown that after classifying the recipients, the grain sector has, in conjunction with the administration and mass organizations at all levels, deleted 329,377 persons from the list of people to whom the state had sold rice at the supply price and has also uncovered 30,000 cases of supply contrary to the fixed criteria and detected 18,654 persons who had been

irregularly supplied. In particular, the state formerly sold each month 22,000 tons of rice at the supply price to 2.6 million people in Ho Chi Minh City; this figure has now come down to 2.17 million--that is, a monthly reduction of 4,500 tons of grain to be sold at the supply price.

The initial result of the control over consumption and the classification of supply receipts according to different quantity-price criteria is that not only has the volume destined for distribution been reduced by 200,000 tons but the distribution task itself has also become relatively rational and a fixed amount of grain saved. The distribution scope has also been narrowed down partially and its targets managed more closely. In our opinion, it is, however, easier to update and control the grain ration of individual consumer households despite their large number than to control the collective grain buying books of large canteens and units with a large number of workers, especially of state farms and work sites where the numerical strength of various sectors and trades fluctuate continually, which will give rise to negative practices in distribution. The grain sector once cooperated with the workers' control organizations in inspecting a number of collective canteens and found out that there was a surplus of grain at every inspected place. A recent inspection tour at the Pha Lai Thermoelectric Power Plant work site and some installations subordinate to Chi Linh District (Hai Hung) has led to the retrieval of 50 tons of grain which were kept in stock without good reason. The self-inspection made by Enterprise No 104 under the higher-level organ's guidance has revealed a surplus of 24,178 kgs of grain formerly allocated to 120 persons who had quit their jobs or freely taken leave of absence. Following a preliminary revision of the list of consumers in Quang Nam-Da Nang who received supplies from 1976 to 1981, it has been found that the state has suffered a loss of 765 tons of grain due to the false statements of consumer units. All that proves that though the grain loss sustained in this stage [distribution] by the state has been heavy, the working method currently applied by the grain sector will provide only a superficial but not radical cure. This means that if something suspicious comes into view, an inspection will be ordered and that if some surplus is uncovered on inspection, it will be retrieved for the state's benefit but that usually no thoroughness will be exercised to deal with the recipient-consumers and to help, follow up and manage them appropriately. This is precisely the reason why "each inspection conducted at a given unit brought out some problem... though this unit had been inspected many times." (Recapitulative report by the Ministry of Food)

The distribution sector includes a retail sale network whose density is second only to that of the commercial and public health sectors. This network is composed of retail shops which directly serve consumption targets and which are placed under the state's responsibility. Instead of scrutinizing the professional activities of this network, we will merely examine these two tasks--management and service--from the consumer's point of view. Due to loopholes in merchandise management, a large amount of grain has leaked from this network to the free market. Taking advantage of changes in the transfers among the population, of allocations and purchases on presentation of ration stamps and of grain transfer orders, dishonest people have sneaked out hundreds of tons of state-owned rice of

good quality. The tricks played therein are usually very subtle and carefully hidden. For instance, a shop in K.T. Street, Hanoi, was one of those which had become the "leading banners" in their respective localities and been slated to be awarded the Labor Medal. However, an inspection revealed that both the head of the shop and its personnel were involved in the theft of state goods.

The loss of grain right in the shops is not rare; it has occurred in every province and almost all districts; many sad lessons have been drawn from the loss of property and cadres in this sector. We believe that there have been loopholes in management and shortcomings in personnel employment. A leading cadre of the sector once told us: "Almost all of our salesclerks have not attended any [vocational] school or course and little attention was paid to choosing them on the basis of their virtues. The situation among shop managing cadres is similar though some consideration was given to their abilities and seniority when they were promoted to this position." Recently, the grain sector has been trying to improve management, to intensify inspection and control, to convene the customers' conferences, to train the young generation and to select them on the basis of their qualities for gradual replacement of the old generation. Such a course of action is wise but public opinion wants it to be done more quickly by the grain sector because the merchandise is still leaking therefrom and because the many millions of consumers who come to the shops a few times per month are still unhappy on returning home after experiencing short-changing, falsehood, overbearing manners and troublesome formalities at these shops.

Managing rice for millions of people and catering to other needs for grain at a time when agricultural production is not yet proportional to the consumption demand is indeed a difficult and complex task. Nevertheless, the grain sector must do better, especially in such specific stages as transportation, receipt and distribution where the state-owned grain is being lost. Only by soundly organizing collection-purchase, transportation, preservation, processing and distribution while putting an end to spoilage, waste and loss can the grain sector contribute to stepping up grain production and to gradually overcoming the present difficult situation.

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

TRANSPORTATION SECTORS IMPROVE ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 31 Jul 82 p 1

[Article: "Improving Organization and Management To Raise Transporting Capacity"]

[Text] Since the beginning of this year the sea, river, railroad and automobile transportation sectors have been trying to reorganize all aspects of their activities and have lately begun making some progress.

In the first 6 months of this year, the volume of goods transported by sea routes showed an increase over the same period last year. Saigon Harbor was quickly unloading foreign ships, with bonuses awarded for fast unloading-loading being on the rise and fines imposed on slow unloading-loading showing a sharp decrease. Although Haiphong Harbor in 6 months achieved only 45.5 percent of its plan for the year, the volume of goods unloaded and loaded increased by 9 percent as compared with the first 6 months of 1981. Warehouses and storage yards in that harbor were organized more neatly and rationally than before, with 80 percent of ships being unloaded either on schedule or ahead of schedule by 2-6 days.

The river transportation sector, which carries coal to the power plants, achieved 64 percent of its plan this year, showing an increase over the same period in the last few years. In the first 23 days of June, the Automobile Transportation Department transported imported goods at the average rate of 1,518 tons per day, or 18 percent more than the one set by the Ministry of Communications and Transportation.

After having improved organization and management, the railroad sector is striving to restore good order to its running trains. Beginning on 1 June, new regulations were adopted by two train units running on the Hanoi-Nam Dinh line and received initial welcome from passengers.

As in the railroad sector, to improve the organization and management of river boat units, automobile runs by teams and the reorganization of loading-unloading in harbors is being applied on a trial basis to get some experience and to promote

further improvement. Transportation enterprises are seeking many measures to exploit the existing capacities, to rationally use means of all kinds, to increase the percentage of two-way transportation of goods, to concentrate on repairs of boats and vehicles, to apply many forms of contracts and piecework wages and to encourage boosting productivity in transportation. The river transportation sector is organizing additional regulating stations along its routes. The railroad sector is dividing its daily operations into different levels to ensure a unified, timely and effective command. The relationships between boats and harbors, railroad trains and stations, among various means of transportation, between central and local transportation and transportation units and customers are being studied for a satisfactory solution and clear-cut division and determination of responsibilities.

All transportation sectors, enterprises and corporations have pledged to carry out in the best manner their plans for loading and unloading goods, repairing the means of transportation, regulating transportation, building the material and technical base, practicing thrift and fighting negative phenomena. In the spirit of making up in any week, month or semester for any deficiencies in the preceding week, month or semester, all units have taken positive measures to actively carry out their plan for the last 6 months of this year. The railroad sector is striving to reduce the time needed between 2 runs for train cars from 11.2 to 7.5-8 days; to get on-time departures and arrivals for the Thong Nhat passengers-carrying trains on the Hanoi-Binh Trieu line in 90 and 80 percent of their runs, respectively, and on-time departures and arrivals in 80 percent of the runs of express trains and trains on the Hanoi-Nam Dinh, Hanoi-Haiphong and Hue-Da Nang lines; and to gradually reduce and eventually end such phenomena as stopping trains at nonscheduled places and making illegal deals with dishonest business people in carrying passengers and goods free and smuggling tickets to the outside. The river transportation sector has pledged to exceed the volume of coal to carry to power plants, to supply the railroad sector with enough coal for it to run its trains and to quickly transport grain and imported goods from harbors. The automobile transportation sector has pledged to fulfill all transportation norms, to save 520 tons of fuels and to reduce and prevent incidence of thefts. Boat units and harbors have pledged to reach loading-unloading goals, to unload ships more quickly than before and to shorten the time needed between two runs of their means of transportation.

HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE

PUBLIC OPINION ALERTED TO UNLAWFUL FILM SHOWINGS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 31 Jul 82 p 3

[Article by Tran Tung of Hanoi: "For A Wholesome Cultural Life -- Alerting Public Opinion to Showing of Unlawful Films"]

[Text] After the liberation of the South there appeared in the large cities in both parts of the country the covert business of circulating decadent cultural products, such as showing 8- and 16-mm films owned by private people. Later, 35-mm films of all categories and sources were also shown in a number of public locations at high admission prices. Quite a few professional film-showing units under the management of sectors, mass organizations, organs, enterprises, schools, etc. violated the state regulations on film showing by deliberately renting, borrowing and showing films that were not under the management of the central film-distributing organ. A number of organs and schools even organized doing "plan 3" business on a regular basis with unlawful film sources. Films that were put aside for research work were sometimes shown by some organs and units which sold tickets to make money for themselves. The few organs that were allowed to show films only for foreign visitors to view took advantage of such films and showed them widely to make money.

Unlawful film showings in the free market, with tickets being sold at any prices, are uncontrollable. From 5 to 50 dong or more. Tickets that fall into the hands of dealers to be sold in the black market can be as high as hundreds of dong.

This messy situation first took place only in large cities but has later spread to many towns and localities all over the country. The seriousness of this situation at the present time is the widespread and illegal wrongdoings of a number of organs and individuals who disregard the existing state regulations.

As we promptly look at the unlawfully circulated films, we find they are quite varied and complicated.

Of the category of decadent cultural products are pornographic films, which in some cases bear the label of educational or science-popularizing films. We do not need to say much about this kind of films that must be absolutely prohibited.

Of the unlawfully circulated films some have a vague humanity-oriented content making propaganda for the family and social values of feudal and bourgeois colors. Others belong to the category of simplistic entertainment and superficial treatment of personal and social problems in the form of light comedy. Quite a large number of still others are the commercial films well known on the silver screens around the world and mainly belonging to the two categories of social psychology and adventure -- kung fu, gangsters and even propaganda for fascist and aggressive wars.

The sources of films being shown unlawfully are quite complicated. Some -- mainly 8- and 16-mm -- are "personal properties" that existed in the South prior to the liberation. Presently, what we must be concerned about is being aware of an international reactionary and imperialist plot to continue sending covertly in parcels and family gifts mailed through postal services decadent cultural products in the form of films and video cassettes. The films that are unlawfully shown are also supplied by very many foreign agencies stationed in large cities. Many films owned by a number of sectors, organs and mass organizations have been obtained in direct exchanges with foreign countries or given as gifts. Recently there appeared video cassettes to be shown on small screens being either brought in from abroad or recorded right in the country. In a number of places where this system is available such cassettes are widely shown as a business activity. Between the film-showing and television units there is in reality a competition in regard to doing business with films. A number of units showing state-owned films, under the pretext of getting not enough films distributed through the official channel, deliberately rented films from sources that were not officially authorized to deal in films and showed them to make money, with the support of the local managerial organs. Some local managerial echelons on the one hand stopped the showings of a number of films officially distributed by the cultural sector and, on the other, automatically authorized frequent showings of a number of foreign films which are not under management of and distribution by the cultural sector. Others deliberately set up units in charge of showing and renting unlawful films, thus violating the regulations on registration of projectors and film-showing units.

About film distribution management, the state has promulgated official documents to determine the task and power of the central import-export and distribution organ in the Motion Picture Department of the Ministry of Culture. They are Decision No 148/TTg of the Premier dated 13 May 1971 and defining the task of strengthening management of import-export and distribution of motion pictures; the inter-ministerial Circular No 57/TTLB of the Ministries of Culture and Foreign Affairs and Public Security, dated 9 June 1972, providing guidelines for the above-mentioned decision of the Premier; and Directive No 107/CTTW of the VCP Central

Committee Secretariat, dated 30 March 1980, on reorganizing the film-reviewing system and strengthening management of unlawfully circulated films. These documents all stress the importance and practical effects of using films as a tool of propaganda and ideological, moral and esthetic education for large audiences and affirm the legal aspect of unified management of film distribution from central to local levels. The major regulations include the following:

- Only the central film import-export and distribution organ has the power to import, export, deal in and distribute films throughout the land.
- Sectors and mass organizations must submit any films they have (acquiring them as gifts, in direct exchanges with foreign countries or by their own making) to the National Review Board, which is organized by the Ministry of Culture in coordination with the sectors concerned, through the motion picture sector for consideration and decision about the use of each film.
- Individuals and groups are not authorized to freely use and do business in connection with any motion pictures that have not been approved by the National Review Board.

Decisions of the National Review Board are valid on a nationwide basis; in localities, the propaganda, training and culture organs can organize screenings, mostly in the case of important films, for the purpose of determining positive use plans and the aspects to be exploited in conformity with the need of their own localities, but not for the purpose of reviewing them again.

The responsible organs have recently uncovered and handled many cases of unlawful film showings and thus to some extent curbed any further development of the bad situation. However, since their action was not an overall measure, it could not resolve completely the present chaotic situation of film distribution. We must make every organ and individual seriously obey the state regulations in this regard. All film projectors, before being operated, must be issued permits from the motion picture management organs assigned by the state to do this job. The heads of these organs must strictly supervise the film-showing activities of their units and at the same time encourage the masses to take part in a wide and permanent inspection of any unlawful film showings in society aimed at uncovering them in time and preventing them from taking place.

To restore and maintain the film-showing order and pattern on a nationwide basis is to respond to today's urgent objective demand in regard to the task of providing the masses with political, ideological and esthetic education, as well as the motion-picture business task of our state.

BIOGRAPHIC

INFORMATION ON VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES

[The following information on Vietnamese personalities has been extracted from Vietnamese-language sources published in Hanoi, unless otherwise indicated. Asterisked job title indicates that this is the first known press reference to this individual functioning in this capacity.]

Lê Quý An [LEE QUYS AN]

Head of the Railway and Road Transportation College; his article "Some Thoughts on College Training" appeared in the cited source. (DAI HOC VA TRUNG HOC CHUYEN NGHIEP No 4, Apr 82 p 9)

Phan Anh [PHAN ANH]

Chairman of the Presidium of the Vietnam Committee for the Defense of World Peace; on 2 Jul 82 he attended a rally in support of peace and disarmament and against the warlike plots of the American imperialists and reactionary forces. (NHAN DAN 3 Jul 82 p 1)

Nguyễn Can [NGUYEENX CAN]

SRV ambassador to Malaysia; recently he attended a series of meetings between Nguyen Co Thach and Malaysian officials. (NHAN DAN 29 Jul 82 p 1)

Mai Xuân Cảnh [MAI XUAAN CANHR]

SRV chargé d'affaires in Luxembourg; on 27 Jul 82 he met with the chairman of the International Relations Committee at the Luxembourg Communist Headquarters. (NHAN DAN 1 Aug 82 p 4)

Lê Đức Cầm [LEE DUWCS CAWNG]

Acting head of Asia Department 2, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; on 6 Jul 82 he attended the opening of the Indochina Foreign Ministers Conference in Ho Chi Minh City. (NHAN DAN 7 Jul 82 p 1)

Vũ Xuân Chiêm [VUS XUAAN CHIEEM], Major General

Chief minister of national defense; on 10 Jul 82 he attended a reception at the Albanian Embassy marking the anniversary of the Albanian People's Army. (NHAN DAN 11 Jul 82 p 4)

Trần Huy Chương [TRAAF HUY CHUOWNG]

Director of Asia Department 3, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; recently he attended a series of meetings between Nguyen Co Thach and Malaysian officials in Malaysia. (NHAN DAN 29 Jul 82 p 1)

Phạm Mạnh Diễm [PHAMJ MANHJ ZIEEMX]

*Ambassador of the SRV to Nepal; his appointment was reported in the cited source. (Kathmandu THE RISING NEPAL 10 Jul 82 p 6)

Nguyễn Việt Dũng [NGUYEENX VIEETJ ZUNGX]

*Director of the Office of the National Assembly and Council of State; on 31 Jul 82 he attended the farewell party for the Mongolian ambassador. (NHAN DAN 1 Aug 82 p 1)

Hoàng Trọng Đại [HOANGF TRONGJ DAIJ]

*President of the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce; on 16 Jul 82 he signed an agreement with the Machine Industry Association of India. (NHAN DAN 17 Jul 82 p 4)

Lê Đại [LEE DAIJ]

Alternate member of the Central Committee of the VCP; secretary of the VCP Committee, Quang Ninh Province; on 12-13 Jul 82, he attended the meeting convened by the VCP Secretariat to discuss implementation of the 1982 Socialist Emulation Program. (NHAN DAN 17 Jul 82 p 1)

Nguyễn Đức Dân [NGUYEENX DUWCS DANF]

Acting editor-in-chief of the arts and letters journal NGHIEN CUU NGHE THUAT; his name appeared on the masthead of the cited source. (NGHIEN CUU NGHE THUAT Mar-Apr 82 p 1)

Ngô Diên [NGOO DIEENF]

SRV ambassador to Kampuchea; on 14 Jul 82 he attended a farewell meeting for Vietnamese troops returning home. (NHAN DAN 18 Jul 82 p 1)

Nguyễn Thị Bình [NGUYEENX THIJ DINHJ]

President of the Vietnam Women's Union; member of the Presidium of the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity and Friendship with People of Other Nations; on 27 Jul 82 she headed a delegation to Mozambique. (NHAN DAN 29 Jul 82 p 4)

Phạm Xuân Đồng [PHAMJ XUAAN DOONGS]

*Deputy secretary of the CPV Committee, Thai Binh Province; on 1 Apr 82 he attended a conference on oriental medicine in his province. (TAP CHI DONG Y No 175, Mar 82 p 32)

¹Nguyễn Duy Già [NGUYEENX ZUY GIA]

Director general of the Vietnam State Bank; on 14 Jul 82 he attended a Bastille Day Reception at the French Embassy. (NHAN DAN 15 Jul 82 p 1)

¹Lê Khắc Hiến [LEE KHAWCS HIEENS]

*Vice chairman of the People's Committee, Vung Tau-Con Dao Special Zone; on 25 May 82 he attended the closing ceremonies of a writer's conference in his jurisdiction. (VAN NGHE 26 Jun 82 p 12)

¹Phạm Đình Hào [PHAMJ DINHF HAOF]

Head of the Commerce Service, Quang Nam-Da Nang Province; he wrote a letter concerning construction costs. (NHAN DAN 20 Jul 82 p 2)

¹Ngô Chí Hoat [NGOO CHIS HOATJ]

Deputy head of the Irrigation Department of the Water Conservancy Ministry; his article on how to improve the management of the Irrigation Department appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 21 Jul 82 p 2)

¹Vũ Nguyễn Hồng [VUS NGUYEEN HOONGF], deceased

Deputy Secretary of the United Buddhist Association; died 20 Jul 82, at age 76. (NHAN DAN 21 Jul 82 p 4)

¹Tôn Gia Huyền [TOON GIA HUYEEN]

*Acting head of the Cultivated Field Management General Department; his article "Using and Managing Agricultural Lands" appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 21 Jul 82 p 2)

¹Phùng Văn Khang [PHUNGF VAWN KHANG], deceased

Born in 1927; member of the VCP; former head of the Propaganda and Training Department of the VCP Organization, Railway General Department; he died following an illness on 11 Jul 82. (NHAN DAN 14 Jul 82 p 4)

¹Phạm Hồng Khôi [PHAMJ HOONGF KHOOI]

Deputy head of the Forestry Service, Ha Son Binh Province; he responded to criticism concerning lumbering activities in his province. (NHAN DAN 14 Jul 82 p 2)

²Vũ Lăng [VUX LAWNG] Lieutenant General

Director of the Army Institute; recently he greeted Truong Chinh who came to visit the institute. (NHAN DAN 5 Aug 82 p 1)

Đinh Nho Liêm [DINH NHO LIEEM]

*SRV ambassador to the USSR; on 4 Aug 82 he presented his credentials to V. V. Kuznetsov, 1st deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. (NHAN DAN 5 Aug 82 p 1)

Nam Long [NAM LONG] Major General

Vice chairman of the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity and Friendship with the Palestinian People; on 28 Jul 82 he attended a meeting with a representative of the PLO. (NHAN DAN 29 Jul 82 p 1)

Đặng Đức Lộc [DANGJ DUWCS LOOCJ]

Vice chairman of the People's Committee, Hanoi; recently he attended a meeting on Poland's National Day. (NHAN DAN 21 Jul 82 p 4)

Nguyễn Mai [NGUYEENX MAIJ]

*Head of the business college; his article "Thoughts and Acts in Accordance With the Resolution of the 5th Party Congress" appeared in the cited source. (DAI HOC VA TRUNG HOC CHUYEN NGHIEP No 4, Apr 82 p 4)

Vũ Mão [VUS MAOX]

Member of the VCP Central Committee, *first secretary of the Ho Chi Minh Youth Union; on 15 Jul 82 he headed a delegation to Kampuchea. (TIEN PHONG 20-26 Jul 82 p 1)

Phan Đoàn Nam [PHAN ZOANX NAM]

Director of the General Affairs Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; recently he attended a series of meetings between Nguyen Co Thach and Malaysian officials in Malaysia. (NHAN DAN 29 Jul 82 p 1)

Nguyễn Văn Nanh [NGUYEENX VAWN NGANHJ]

SRV chargé d'affaires in Nicaragua; on 17 Jul 82 he attended the arrival in Nicaragua of a SRV delegation headed by Minister Nguyen Va Hieu. (NHAN DAN 20 Jul 82 p 1)

Nguyễn Vĩnh Nghiệp [NGUYEENX VINHX NGRIIEPJ]

Standing member of the VCP Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; his article "Product Contracting and the Strengthening and Development of the Agricultural Cooperativization Movement" appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 5 Jul 82 p 2)

Nguyễn Ngọc [NGUYEENX NGOCJ]

Secretary of the VCP Fraction of the Vietnam Writers Association; deputy secretary general of the Vietnam Writers Association; on 26 May 82 he attended the closing ceremonies of a writers conference in the Vung Tau-Con Dao Special Zone. [VAN NGHE 26 Jun 82 p 12]

Nguyễn Hữu Ngộ [NGUYEENX HUWUX NGOO]

TRV ambassador to Cuba; on 15 Jul 82 he presided over a medal-giving ceremony. (NHAN DAN 17 Jul 82 p 4)

Dinh Quang Ngự [DINH QUANG NGUWJ]

*Head of the Labor Service, Vung Tau-Con Dao Special Zone; his article "Thoughts on [Vocational] Guidance for Students" appeared in the cited source. (Vung Tau- VUNG TAU-CON DAO 17 Jun 82 p 2)

Trương Sĩ Phan [TROWUWNG SIX PHAN], deceased

Member of the Vietnam Committee for the Defense of World Peace; specialist in the Foreign Relations Department; member of the VCP; former editor of the newspaper Cuu Quoc; born 1924, died 21 Jul 82. (NHAN DAN 22 Jul 82 p 4)

Đỗ Thanh Phong [DOOX THANH PHONG]

Deputy head of the Agriculture Department [VCP Committee], Tay Ninh Province; his article concerning the management of lands in Tay Ninh appeared in this issue of source. (NHAN DAN 23 Jul 82 p 2)

Bùi Hồng Phúc [BUIF NOONGF PHUCS]

Director of the West Asia-Africa Department 1 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; on 27 Jul 82 he attended a meeting with a representative of the PLO. (NHAN DAN 29 Jul 82 p 1)

Vũ Quang [VUX QUANG]

Member of the Central Committee of the VCP; *head of the Foreign Relations Department of the Central Committee of the VCP; on 2 Jul 82 he attended the return from the USSR of General Secretary Le Duan. (NHAN DAN 3 Jul 82 p 1)

Phạm Khắc Quảng [PHAMJ KRAWCS QUANGR]

Chairman of the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity and Friendship with the Palestinian People; on 28 Jul 82 he attended a meeting with a representative of the PLO. (NHAN DAN 29 Jul p 1)

Nguyễn Công Say [NGUYEENX COONG SAY] aka Nguyễn Hữu Nghĩa [NGUYEEN HUWUX NGHIA], deceased

Secretary of the VCP Committee, Quang Ngai city; member of the Communist Party of Indochina since 1930; on 22 Jul 82 he died of a heart attack at age 72. (NHAN DAN 29 Jul 82 p 4)

Hoàng Bích Sơn [HOANG BICHS SOWN]

Vice minister of Foreign Affairs; on 5 Jul 82 he attended the arrival in Ho Chi Minh City of the Foreign Ministers of Laos and Kampuchea. (NHAN DAN 6 Jul 82 p 1)

Phan Minh Tân [PHAN MINH TANHS]

Member of the VCP Central Committee; deputy secretary of the VCP Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; on 20 Jul 82 he visited the troops returning from Kampuchea. (NHAN DAN 22 Jul 82 p 1)

Nguyễn Đức Tâm [NGUYEENX DUWCS TAAM]

Head of the Organization Department of the VCP Central Committee; on 5 Aug 82 he greeted the arrival of the delegation of the Commission for Organization of the Central Committee of the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea. (NHAN DAN 6 Aug 82 p 1)

Lê Trọng Tấn [LEE TRONGJ TAANS], Colonel General

Member of the VCP Central Committee; chief of staff of the VPA; recently he spoke at a conference convened by the Council of Ministers to discuss implementation of the military service law. (NHAN DAN 8 Jul 82 p 4)

Lê Quang Thành [LEE QUANG THANH]

Secretary of the VCP Committee, Vung Tau-Con Dao Special Zone; on 10 Jun 82 he attended inaugural ceremonies for the opening of the Port of Vung Tau. (Vung Tau VUNG TAU-CON DAO 17 Jun 82 p 1)

Võ Trung Thành [VOX TRUNG THANH] alias Năm Vĩnh [NAM VINH], deceased

Member of the Central Committee of the VCP; secretary of the VCP Committee, Nghia Binh Province; he died following an illness on 12 Jul 82 at age 58. He was born on 4 Apr 24 to a farming family in Pho Cuong Village, Duc Pho District, Quang Ngai Province (now in Nghia Binh Province). In 1944 he participated in the Viet Minh Front. In Mar 45 he was Secretary of the Socialist National Salvation Youth. Following the General Uprising he became a member of the People's Committee, Duc Pho District. In 1946 he became a member of the Indochina Communist Party. During the resistance against the French he was successively appointed secretary of the Communist Party Committee, Duc Pho District, deputy secretary of the party committee, Kon Tum Province, standing member of the Communist Party Committee, Gia Lai-Kon Tum Province and secretary of the Communist Party Committee, Gia Lai Province; during the resistance against the Americans he was appointed successively to the Executive Committee of the 5th Region, head of the 5th Region Mountain Zone Missions Department, secretary of the Communist Party Committee, Dac Lac Province and secretary of the Communist Party Committee, Gia Lai Province. In 1974 he was directed to make preparations for the liberation of Buon Me Thuot and the three Central

[continued]

Võ Trung Thành [continued]

Highlands Provinces. Following the liberation of the Central Highlands he was appointed deputy secretary of the VCP Committee, Gia Lai Kon Tum Province. He was a delegate to the 7th National Assembly. At the 5th Congress of the VCP he was elected a member of the Central Committee and appointed secretary of the VCP Committee, Nghia Binh Province. (NHAN DAN 13 Jul 82 p 1)

Lâm Văn Thô [LAAM VAWN THEE]

Member of the Central Committee of the VCP; chairman of the People's Committee, Vung Tau-Con Dao Special Zone; on 10 Jun 82 he participated in ceremonies inaugurating the Port of Vung Tau. (VUNG TAU VUNG TAU-CON DAO 17 Jun 82 p 1)

Hoàng Văn Thịnh [HOANG QUOC THINH]

Head of the Finance and Management Department of the VCP Central Committee; on 1 Jul 82 he attended the return to Hanoi of a VCP delegation that had visited Bulgaria. (NHAN DAN 6 Jul 82 p 1)

Lê Phước Thọ [LEE PHUOWCS THOJ]

Member of the VCP Central Committee; *secretary of the VCP Committee, Hau Giang Province; on 2 Jun 82 he attended an arts and letters conference in his province. (VAN NGHE 26 Jun 82 p 12)

Nguyễn Hữu Thọ [NGUYEENX HUWU THOJ]

Chairman of the National Assembly of the SRV; on 27 Jul 82 he visited soldiers at a hospital in Ho Chi Minh City. (NHAN DAN 30 Jul 82 p 1)

Hoàng Trung Thông [HOANG TRUNG THOONG]

Head of the Literary Studies Institute; editor-in-chief of the literary journal TAP CHI VAN HOC; his name appeared as the author of a letter to the 5th Congress of the VCP and on the masthead of the cited source. (TAP CHI VAN HOC No 2, Mar & Apr 82 pp 1, 160)

Nguyễn Văn Thuận [NGUYEENX VAWN THUAANF]

Editor-in-chief of the engineering journal KY THUAT CO KHI; his name appeared in the masthead of the cited publication. (KY THUAT CO KHI No 2, Jun 82 (1982) front cover)

Nguyễn Hữu Thúc [NGUYEENX HUWUX THUWOWC]

Deputy head of the Biology Institute, Vietnam Institutes of Science; his interview concerning the importance of biology appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DOI NHAN DAN 4 Jul 82 p 2)

Trần Thị Tĩnh [TRANH THIJ TINHS]

Vice head of the Kindergarten Department; her article concerning the new kindergarten program appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 22 Jul 82 p 3)

Nguyễn Văn Trọng [NGUYEENX VAWN TRONGJ]

Deputy head of the Foreign Relations Department of the VCP Central Committee; recently, he met with a representative of the Japanese Communist Party. (NHAN DAN 17 Jul 82 p 1)

Lê Truyền [LEE TRUYEENF]

Member of the Central Committee of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union; secretary of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union, Hai Hung Province; his article about the concentration of youth forces in the agriculture program appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 21 Jul 82 p 3)

Nguyễn Tuy [NGUYEENX TUY]

Head of the Accounting, Statistics and Finance Department of the Ministry of Forestry; his article concerning forest preservation appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 21 Jul 82 p 2)

Trần Danh Tuyên [TRANH ZANH TUYEEN]

Chairman of the Vietnam-Japan Friendship Association; on 15 Jul 82 he attended a reception marking the anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of Japan. (NHAN DAN 16 Jul 82 p 1)

Vũ Quốc Uy [VUX QUOOC UY]

Secretary general of the Vietnam-Soviet Friendship Association; on 27 Jul 82 he made a speech at a meeting of the association against the Reagan government and other reactionary powers. (NHAN DAN 28 Jul 82 p 1)

Hồ Sĩ Vĩnh [HOOF SIX VINHJ]

Editorial secretary of the arts and letters journal NGHIEN CUU NGHE THUAT; his name appeared on the masthead of the cited source. (NGHIEN CUU NGHE THUAT No 2, Mar Apr 82 p 1)

Nguyễn Xuân [NGUYEENX XUAN]

SVU ambassador to Laos; recently he attended a meeting marking the 5th anniversary of the agreement between Laos and Vietnam. (NHAN DAN 28 Jul p 1)

BIOGRAPHIC

INFORMATION ON VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES

[The following information on Vietnamese personalities has been extracted from Vietnamese-language sources published in Hanoi, unless otherwise indicated. Asterisked job title indicates that this is the first known press reference to this individual functioning in this capacity.]

Trần Huy Chương [TRANG HUY CHUONG]

*Acting Head of Asia Department 3, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; on 21 Jul 82 he arrived in Rangoon, Burma as part of the delegation headed by Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach. (Rangoon THE WORKING PEOPLE'S DAILY 22 Jul 82 p 8)

Võ Chí Công [VOX CHIS COONG]

Member of the Political Bureau of the VCP Central Committee, member of the Secretariat of the VCP Central Committee; recently he headed a delegation to Bulgaria on the 100th birthday of Georgi Dimitrov. (HANOI MOI 17 Jun 82 p 4)

Nguyễn Văn Đạo [NGUYEENX VAWN DAOJ]

Publisher of the journal of mechanics TAP CHI CO HOC; his name appeared on the masthead of the cited source. (TAP CHI CO HOC No 1 Vol IV [Mar], 82 inside front cover)

Trần Bửu Hùng [TRANG BU HUNG], Major General

His article "River Crossings and Protecting River Crossings in Modern Combat" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN No 7, Jul 82 p 36)

Lee Quang Hoang [LEE QUANG HOAF], Lieutenant General

His article "The Commander and Problems in Improving Discipline" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN No 7, Jul 82 p 32)

Võ Văn Hùng [VOX VAWN HUAF]

Chairman of the People's Committee of Tan Uyen District, Song Be Province; his article about the use of lands and labor in Tan Uyen appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 2 Aug 82 p 2)

Nguyễn Sĩ Hoat [NGUYEENX SIX HOATJ]

SRV Ambassador to Afghanistan; on 2 Aug 82 he signed an agreement with the Afghanistan News Agency on behalf of the Vietnam News Agency. (NHAN DAN 7 Aug 82 p 4)

Vũ Quốc Hùng [VUX QUOOCS HUNGF]

Member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union, * Acting First Secretary of the Vietnam Federation of University Students; on 16 Jun 82 he attended a meeting at Hanoi Polytechnic College to show support for the Palestinians and others against Israel. (HANOI MOI 17 Jun 82 p 1)

Trần Hứa [TRAAHF HUWAS] deceased

Member of the VCP; Member of the Current Affairs Committee, Director of the Lifestyle Department of the Vietnam Confederation of Trade Unions; on 17 Jun 82 he died at age 51 after a serious illness. (HANOI MOI 18 Jun 82 p 4)

Đàm Tài Hưng [DAMF TAIS HUWNG], *Lieutenant Colonel

His article "Some Special Characteristics in the Art of Battle Deployment in the War Between the Ly and Tran" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN No 1, Jan 82 p 63)

Nguyễn Khang [NGUYEENX KHANG]

Vice Chairman of the People's Committee of Cam Thuy District, Thanh Hoa Province; his article on raising fish appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 4 Aug 82 p 2)

Bách Ngọc Liên [BACHJ NGOCJ LIEENX], Senior Colonel

His article "The Special Operations Forces and the Art of the Attack" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN No 3, Mar 82 p 30)

Ngô Đình Liêu [NGOO DINHF LIEEU] Lieutenant Colonel deceased

Cadre of the Military Technical Institute of the Vietnam People's Army; on 22 Jan 82 he died of illness. (HANOI MOI 24 Jun 82 p 4)

Phan Đoan Nam [PHAN ZOANX NAM]

*Acting Head of the Political Affairs General Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; on 21 Jul 82 he arrived in Rangoon, Burma as part of the delegation headed by Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach. (Rangoon THE WORKING PEOPLE'S DAILY 22 Jul 82 p 8)

Ta Nhôn [TAJ NHOWN], *Lieutenant Colonel

His article "Principles of the Rear Services Mission in Combat" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN No 3, Mar 82 p 42)

Nguyễn Việt Phưởng [NGUYEENX VIEETS PHUWOWNG], *Senior Colonel

His article "Experiences in Command Guidance to Insure Strategic Rear Services on Axis 559 during the 1973-1975 Phase" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN No 3, Mar 82 p 55)

Trần Văn Quy [TRAANF VAWN QUY], Doctor

*Head of the Planning Department, Ministry of Public Health; his article "The 1982 Public Health Plan" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI Y HOC THUC HANH No 2, Mar-Apr 82 p 1)

Hoàng Minh Thăng [HOANGF MINH THAWNGS]

Member of the Central Committee of the VCP; Chairman of the People's Committee, Quang Nam-Danang Province; his article "More Attention to the Application of Science and Technology Achievements" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Jun 82 p 26)

Hoàng Quốc Thịnh [HOANGF QUOOC THINHJ]

Head of the Central Finance and Management Department of the VCP; he was part of a delegation to Bulgaria on 12 Jun 82. (HANOI MOI 13 Jun 82 p 1)

Lê Tiến Thịnh [LEE TIEENS THINHJ], Senior Colonel

*Head of the Military Supplies Department, Rear Services General Department; his article "Maintaining the Feeding Level for the Troops" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN No 5, May 82 p 47)

Lê Thế Thọ [LEE THEES THOJ]

Secretary General of the Vietnam Soccer Association; recently he took a team to Bulgaria and the USSR. (HANOI MOI 20 Jun 82 p 1)

Nguyễn Quốc Thuộc [NGUYEENX QUOOC THUWOWCS], *Senior Colonel

His article on the Tay Nguyen Corps "Developing a Good Tradition and Overcoming Negative Manifestations to Build a Strong Corps" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN No 1, Jan 82 p 36)

Lê Quang Thuồng [LEE QUANG THUWOWNGR]

Member of the Central Committee of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union; his article on youth involvement in economical methods of production appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 4 Aug 82 p 3)

Phan Dũng Tiến [PHAN ZUNGX TIEENS]

*Deputy Secretary of the Trade Union Federation, Nghĩa Bình Province; his article "Intensive and Extensive Organization of the Emulation Movement to Serve Agricultural Production" appeared in the cited source. (LAO DONG 12 Aug 82 p 2)

Phan Quang Tiệp [PHAN QUANG TIEEPJ], *Senior Colonel

His article "The Truong Son Corps and the Mission of Coordinating the Economic Building Mission with National Defense" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN No 2, Feb 82 p 32)

Le Đức Tiêt [LEE DUWCS TIEETS], Colonel, Lawyer

His article "Building a Concept of Life with Laws and a Respect for Law in Our Armed Forces" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN No 5, p 28)

Nguyễn Khánh Toàn [NGUYEENX KHANHS TOANF]

Vice President of the Vietnam-Soviet Freindship Association, Chairman of the State Social Science Commission; recently he greeted the arrival of Friendship Associations from Laos, Kampuchea, Mongolia and the USSR in Hanoi. (NHAN DAN 8 Aug 82 p 1)

Nguyễn Đức Triều [NGUYEENX DUWCS TRIEEUF]

Vice Chairman of the People's Committee of Hai Hau District, Ha Nam Ninh Province; his article on Hai Hau rice production appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 9 Aug 82 p 2)

Nguyễn Lý Trọng [NGUYEENX LYS TRONGJ]

*Deputy Head of the Construction Science and Technology Institute; his article "Construction of Large Slab Assembly Housing" appeared in the cited source. (CX XAY DUNG No 7, Jul 82 p 13)

Đỗ Văn Trưng [DOOX VAWN TRUWNGF]

Secretary of the Hanoi Party Committee, Vice-President of Hanoi Polytechnic College; on 16 Jun 82 he attended a meeting to show support for the Palestinian people and other Arab countries against Israel. (HANOI MOI 17 Jun 82 p 1)

Kiều Xuân Tuyền [KIEEUE XUAAN TUYEEN], *Colonel

His article "Coordination of Conventional and Guerrilla Warfare in the Tri-Thien Battle Zone" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN No 7, Jul 82 p 57)

Trình Văn Tư [TRINHJ VAWN TUWJ]

Deputy Head of the Science and Education Department of the VCP Central Committee; his article "One Year's Implementation of the Political Bureaus Resolution on Science and Technology Policy in the Cities and Province" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Jun 82 p 26)

Nguyễn Việt [NGUYEENX VIEETJ], Senior Colonel

His article "Strengthen Army Discipline and Properly Complete Every Mission" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN No 5, May 82 p 36)

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